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AbSTRACT
The regions projected to be most adversely affected by climate change are among 
those deemed of increasing strategic importance to the United States: Africa, the 
Middle East, and Central and South Asia.  The added stress of climate change 
will likely exacerbate existing societal and structural stresses in these areas, re-
ducing living standards and individual well-being and thereby contributing to 
instability, conflict, mass migrations and failing states. Such outcomes present 
fertile ground for terrorist groups, increases the likelihood of humanitarian cri-
ses and can disrupt the flow of energy exports. In this way, the impact of climate 
change on individuals (human security) directly affects the national security of 
the US. 
The growing US focus on stabilization and reconstruction missions, along 
with an increased emphasis on integrated operations comprising both military 
and civilian components, are capabilities directed primarily at improving human 
security as a means of ensuring national security. While the US has not made the 
direct conceptual linkage between climate change and national security as some 
of its European allies have done, US strategic posture and doctrinal shifts are not 
only aimed towards those regions climate change will most negatively affect, but 
will also address those strategic threats most likely worsened by climate change 
impacts. As this study will show, it is increasingly apparent that economic and 
political development efforts in these regions are inseparable from international 
security concerns, and it seems therefore unlikely that the US and its allies will 
remain insulated from the consequences of climate change in developing coun-
tries.
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INTRODUCTION1
Imagine a stack of clear plastic overhead transparencies – those of you who 
remember a time before PowerPoint presentations – on each printed a world 
map of exactly the same size. Suppose that each world map used some colorful 
pattern to depict the geographical preponderance of a particular demographic, 
environmental or political trend. One might begin with a map showing the most 
impoverished regions of the world, then those regions with the highest rate of 
population growth, then those most threatened by disease. The stack of maps 
showing each trend gets higher: areas with water scarcity, food shortages, weak 
or corrupt governments, failing states. One would quickly see clear overlaps 
between the maps, geographically concentrated on Africa, the Middle East, and 
Central and South Asia. New maps can be added to the pile showing regions 
of Islamic fundamentalist activity, the location of oil and gas reserves, instances 
of US military activity since the end of the Cold War, the strategic focus in the 
war on terror, and the current reorganization of US overseas military basing.2 
And then, placed carefully over the others, one final map: the regions of the 
world most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. While the composite im-
age projected onto the wall by the overhead machine reveals some colors in all 
regions of the world, those four regions mentioned above are completely black 
with overlapping trends.
Not coincidently, military planners in the United States view these regions 
collectively as an area of the utmost strategic importance. In an era when in-
ternational terrorism, failed states, transnational criminal organizations, and 
concerns over continued access to energy resources have become national secu-
rity priorities, America’s strategic focus has undergone a substantial geographic 
shift. The Pentagon has identified an area in which weak and failing states com-
bine with a number of destabilizing demographic and societal trends that first 
and foremost affect human security; they call this area the Arc of Instability. 
1 I am grateful to a number of my colleagues who offered comments and suggestions on 
earlier drafts of this study, including Olof Kronvoll, Svein Melby, Johannes Rø, Anders 
Romarheim, Rolf Tamnes, Lene Kristoffersen, and Ingrid Lundestad; also a special 
thanks to Leigh Roberts and Hans Martin Seip. Finally, I would like to thank the 
institutions that kindly provided maps for this study.
2 It must be noted that the term “war on terror” is not a conceptually precise term, 
and its use (or refusal to use) may be construed as support (or protest) for a set of 
policies. The United States demonstrably follows a strategy of actively seeking out 
and destroying Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al Qaeda and its affiliates, 
supporting the efforts of countries battling such groups, and crafting political and 
economic policies designed to weaken terrorist networks. These actions will be termed 
“the war on terror”, the most recognized name for this strategy despite the launching 
of a new name “the long war” to cover these actions. Use of this term acknowledges 
these actions as an important component of US strategy, just as other components of 
US strategy will be discussed without rendering judgement on their effectiveness.
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Stretching from the northern tip of South America, across Africa and the Middle 
East, to Central and South Asia, the threats emanating from this Arc constitute 
the principle threats to US national security.
These threats are not ones easily countered in a traditional manner through 
the application of military force. At their most fundamental level, those factors 
exerting the greatest influence over the threats found in the Arc are related to 
human security. How people are affected by their immediate living standards, 
trends in their societies, and the individual impacts of political processes can 
have serious consequences far beyond the borders of any particular country. 
This obscure and ambiguous security concept becomes a national security pri-
ority when failed states harbor terrorist groups, when social unrest threatens 
a major supplier of US oil, when a coup places the nuclear weapons of a state 
at the disposal of radical groups, or when humanitarian disaster or genocide 
threatens to destabilize an entire region. The September 2001 terrorist attacks 
simply underscored in dramatic fashion a trend that was already well underway: 
the world has become so interconnected and interdependent, and technology so 
advanced and deadly, that traditional conceptions of security are no longer suf-
ficient to protect America’s national interests. 
Climate change will have its most severe effects in precisely those regions 
where states are least prepared – financially and organizationally – to adapt. The 
negative consequences for human security in those areas will aggravate existing 
destabilizing trends and present complex threats to US interests there. Ironically, 
while Americans may feel less threatened by the direct local impacts of climate 
change, US national security will be increasingly eroded. While climate change 
will undoubtedly have serious consequences for the wealthiest and most devel-
oped nations, these countries will likely be among the least affected by the direct 
impacts of the altered environment. Such countries, with substantial finances 
and efficient governmental structures at their disposal, are also reasonably well-
equipped to cope with most of the negative effects. Sadly, this is not the case in 
the developing world.
At its core, this study is an overview of the trends. As such, it glosses over 
a rich and substantial body of academic literature covering many fields of study. 
Its main goal is to show how even the most conservative projected impacts of 
climate change will threaten human security in the Arc of Instability and conse-
quently the national security of developed countries like the United States. It fo-
cuses on the strategic aspects of the problem and omits important aspects of the 
current debate, such as international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
The study assumes, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
does, that some increase in global temperature is unavoidable. By showing how 
climate change threatens human security and therefore presents a real threat to 
state security, the study also emphasizes the role of the military, even as it must 
be acknowledged that such capabilities are only a part of the solution.
An unfortunate gap exists between researchers of environmental security 
(studying links between the environment, scarcity and conflict) and military 
strategists (focusing on terrorism, rogue states and threats to energy supplies). 
A similar gap in strategic thinking separates the US and Europe. While there ap-
pears to be broad agreement on the size and scope of the problems, substantial 
disagreements arise over the proper responses. While the Europeans and the 
Americans share a common threat analysis – terrorism, failed states, weapons 
of mass destruction, organized crime, energy insecurity – the Europeans take a 
bottom-up approach that focuses on human security, while the Americans take 
a top-down approach that prioritizes state security. Despite this difference, the 
military and diplomatic tools being adopted by both are becoming remarkably 
similar. While the US government does not explicitly connect human security to 
national security, the strategic documents make the linkage indirectly. Further-
more, both the Pentagon and the State Department are adopting measures that 
address human security in an integrated, sustainable fashion similar to Europe’s. 
This study will illustrate why this has occurred and show how it represents more 
than a passing trend.
How then might it be demonstrated that US national security is threatened 
by climate change? Part I begins with a discussion of the concept of security, re-
vealing two distinct categories: traditional (state) and human security. Many of 
the trends that pose the greatest risks to human security will then be presented 
to show why, regardless of the effects of climate change, certain regions are vul-
nerable to instability. Then the IPCC’s projected impacts of climate change will 
be summarized. These impacts alone present serious risks to human security, 
but they will also exacerbate existing destabilizing trends and place incredible 
stresses on humans and states alike. Such risks would be even worse if conflicts 
were to break out as a result of climate change impact. The controversial con-
nection between environment and conflict will therefore be explored to see how 
exactly climate change may worsen these underlying trends and lead to conflicts 
that can have a devastating effect on both state and human security. 
In Part II, current US strategy will be presented, explaining its focus on the 
Arc of Instability and highlighting three important national security threats in 
the Arc: terrorism, energy insecurity and humanitarian crises. Then the study 
will show how human security and national security have merged in these re-
gions, how climate change affects existing threats to US national security and 
what measures are currently being designed to address this development. As this 
study is purely descriptive in nature, it will focus solely on US strategic thinking 
and responses rather than offering judgments on their effectiveness. Finally, the 
US approach will be compared to both the Norwegian security concept and that 
of the European Union, before some conclusions can be drawn and the results 
summarized.
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PART I: ClIMATE ChANGE AND hUMAN SECURITy
The expanding concept of security
The concept of security has been subjected to a comprehensive re-evaluation 
in the past few decades. The traditional discussion of security has the state as 
its referent object, or the focus of security. In this perspective, the continued 
survival of the state is of primary importance. Viewing national security as 
concerned principally with military defense and the accumulation of power is 
strongly linked to the realist school of international relations theory. Political is-
sues relating to national security – high politics – have been traditionally seen as 
of fundamental importance, and therefore “trumping” other political concerns. 
This creates a motivation to expand the scope of what may be considered a 
legitimate focus of security policy, in order to take advantage of the privileged 
position enjoyed by security policy. The concept of securitization (i.e. determin-
ing the focus of security) has become relativist in nature and rests mainly on the 
discourse surrounding a security issue.3 This study will not focus on the term 
security as a tool of political discourse or reflect on the use or misuse of the con-
cept applied to environmental issues. The use of the term security here will be 
much more pedestrian, and divided into two well-known categories: traditional 
and human security.
TRADITIONAl SECURITy
The most recognizable use of “security” equates the term with the continued 
survival of the nation-state. One of the pre-eminent scholars of foreign policy, 
Hans Morganthau, argued that the international system was an anarchical one 
and that states sought to survive by seeking power. In this way, securing the 
material sources of state power – territory, natural resources, economic goods, 
military capabilities, political stability and diplomatic competence – becomes 
the state’s primary national interest.4 National security has traditionally been 
associated with these types of interests and threats, with an emphasis on military 
capabilities.
According to scholar Richard Matthews, a traditional state-centered secu-
rity approach “considers the relationship between new forms of environmental 
change and the objectives and practices of traditional national security com-
munities,” and is therefore “concerned with how to protect the sovereignty, 
territory, culture and citizens of the two hundred sovereign states in the interna-
3 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The structure of international 
security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 71.
4 Hans Morganthau, Politics among Nations, 4th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1968).
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tional system from environmental threat.”5 Among the typical concerns for this 
approach to environmental security would be ensuring access to environmental 
goods outside the state’s borders, border-crossing problems such as air pollution 
or mass migration, and environmental change that causes social instability or 
conflict. Another approach described by Matthews is a humanist perspective, 
where the focus is on the “welfare of mankind. Instead of two hundred entities 
to protect, it assumes six billion individuals in need of security.”6
hUMAN SECURITy
In 1994, the authors of the United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) 
argued that the concept of security was too narrow and that for ordinary people 
“security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemploy-
ment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.”7 
The HDR then proposed a new conceptual framework based on human security. 
The authors predicted that the human security concept would “revolutionize so-
ciety in the 21st century” and must encompass four characteristics. First, human 
security is a universal concern, focusing on real and growing threats relevant 
to all people. Second, the components of human security are interdependent; 
threats will not be confined to national borders, and threats to human security 
will eventually involve all nations. Third, human security can be best ensured 
through prevention rather than intervention, by meeting challenges before they 
become unwieldy. Fourth, human security is people-centered, “concerned with 
how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many 
choices, how much access they have to markets and social opportunities – and 
whether they live in conflict or in peace.”8
The 1994 HDR proposed a two-part definition: safety from chronic threats 
(hunger, disease, repression) and protection from sudden, harmful disruptions to 
the pattern of daily life. The document went on to list seven main categories of 
threats to human security:
Economic security: an assured basic income from employment or a public 
safety net.
Food security: physical and economic access to basic food. The availability 
of food is less of a problem than poor distribution and lack of purchasing 
power.
5 Richard Matthews, “Environmental Change and Human Security: Concepts and 
Definitions” in Global Environmental Change and Human Security: Conceptual and 
Theoretical Issues (University of California Irvine: Global Environmental Change and 
Human Security Program Office, 2002) [online 21 Nov 2007], pp. 7–14.
6 Ibid., p. 9.
7 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 [online 
1 Nov 2007], p. 22.
8 Ibid., p. 23.
•
•
6/2007 FORECASTINg CRISIS
Health security: in both developing and developed countries, disease is the 
leading cause of death, where the threat is greatest among the poor.
Environmental security: threats from the degradation of the local and global 
ecosystem, water scarcity, desertification of land, air pollution.
Personal security: threats from physical violence, including threats from the 
state (torture), other states (war), groups of people (ethnic tensions), indi-
viduals or gangs (crime), threats against women or children (rape, domestic 
violence, child abuse), threats to self (suicide, drug use).
Community security: while membership in groups provides cultural identity, 
values and practical support, they can threaten communities due to repres-
sive practices or be threatened by mass media or other ethnic groups.
Political security: threats from human rights violations and efforts to con-
trol information or ideas.
The concept of human security has been utilized and promoted throughout the 
United Nations’ many agencies, as well as by an informal network of coun-
tries through the Human Security Network. This group emerged from the anti-
landmines campaign in the 1990s and was formally launched in conjunction 
with a 1999 ministerial meeting in Bergen, Norway. Member states include Aus-
tria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand and South Africa as an observer. Ac-
cording to its Internet site, the Human Security Network “identifies concrete 
areas for collective action. It pursues security policies that focus on the protec-
tion and security requirements of the individual and society through promoting 
freedom from fear and freedom from want.”9 The idea of human security has 
also been increasingly utilized by academic studies, replacing the state-centered 
conception of security. In this regard, threats to the state (the focus of traditional 
security) are increasingly being viewed as risks to human security. The following 
section will attempt to broadly outline some trends that pose substantial risks 
to human security.
9 Human Security Network, website, 30 October 2006 [online 15 Nov 2007].
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Underlying risks to human security
POVERTy
Poverty is an underlying factor from which many other risks to human security 
originate. As one UN report stated, “it is in the deprivation of the lives people 
lead that poverty manifests itself. Poverty can mean more than a lack of what is 
necessary for material well-being. It can also mean the denial of opportunities 
and choice most basic to human development – to lead a long, healthy, creative 
life and to enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-esteem and the 
respect of others.”10 A useful index for gauging economic insecurity on a global 
basis is the Human Development Index (HDI) from the United Nations. Ap-
praising human welfare in terms other than material wealth, the HDI combines 
life expectancy, education and purchasing power parity to arrive at a composite 
measure of human development. The 2006 HDI revealed some progress in most 
regions, but a fall in the scores for countries in sub-Saharan Africa.11 Not co-
incidently, the regions most susceptible to instability and conflict are those less 
developed regions, as measured by the HDI. A report by Project Ploughshares 
found that less than two percent of states scoring highest on the Index were in-
volved in an armed conflict from 1997 to 2006, while nearly 39 percent of those 
states scoring lowest experienced at least one conflict.12
POPUlATION TRENDS: GROWTh, yOUTh bUlGES AND URbANIzATION
The United Nations predicts that by 2050 the world population will increase 
from the current 6.7 billion to 9.2 billion, with the bulk of the population growth 
occurring in the less developed regions of the globe.13 While slowly declining fer-
tility rates and increased mortality rates from diseases in the developing world 
have dampened the huge population explosion once predicted, the populations 
there will rise from 5.4 billion (2007) to 7.9 billion (2050). As a report from the 
UK-based Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) observes, “the 
greatest growth will take place in regions likely to face continuing material and 
economic risks.”14 Along with population increases, demographic pattern such 
as age distribution can have an important influence on violence and armed con-
flict. In countries with disproportionately young populations, so-called “youth 
10 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1997, p. 5 
[online 10 Nov 2007].
11 United Nations Development Programme, “Statistics of the human development report 
2006” [online 4 Nov 2007].
12 From Project Ploughshares, “Human Development and Armed Conflicts 1997–2006”, 
fact sheet [online 12 Nov 2007].
13 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population 
Prospects: The 2006 Revision, 2007 [online 29 Oct 2007].
14 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), The DCDC Global Strategic 
Trends Programme 2007–2036 Third Edition, December 2006 [online 10 May 2007], 
p. 7.
bulges”, high unemployment, low education levels and poverty can cause frus-
tration, outbreaks of violence and increased recruitment by armed groups.15
A closely related demographic trend to population growth is that of ur-
banization: 49 percent of the world’s population lived in urban areas in 2005, a 
figure expected to top 60 percent by 2030. While the more developed countries 
currently have a higher rate of urbanization, the population growth in less de-
veloped regions means that the total number of urban dwellers is much greater 
in these countries, a trend compounded by the fact that cities in the developing 
world are also growing almost twice as fast as those in developed regions.16
The UN report also highlighted the growth of mega-cities, defined as urban 
areas with a population of 10 million or more residents. As the report noted, 
“In 2005, among the 20 mega-cities in the world, 15 were located in the less 
developed regions and by 2015, 17 of the 22 mega-cities projected to exist will 
be in today’s developing countries.”17 The UN report questioned the tendency 
to view urbanization trends as entirely negative, with urban dwellers enjoying 
better access to services such as drinking water, sanitation, electricity, health 
care or education. Urbanization may in fact be an indicator of development, as 
cities are “engines of economic, social, political and cultural change.”18 This op-
timistic view of urbanization may be misleading, however. Governments in less 
developed countries often express concern over their continued ability to pro-
vide these basic services, and have attempted to craft policies to control internal 
migration and stem the influx of people to cities.19 
Given the findings of another UN study, this concern may be justified. The 
State of the World’s Cities Report 2006/7 revealed the dual nature of the world’s 
urban areas: “there are two cities within one city – one part of the urban popu-
lation that has all the benefits of urban living, and the other part, the slums and 
squatter settlements, where the poor often live under worse conditions that their 
rural relatives.”20 In many regions, slums are growing at the same rate as urban 
populations, and in sub-Saharan Africa slums account for 70 percent of the ur-
ban population. According to the report, “the world’s one billion slum dwellers 
are more likely to die earlier, experience more hunger and disease, attain less 
education and have fewer chances of employment than those urban residents 
15 See for example Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political 
Violence”, International Studies Quarterly 50(3): 607–629.
16 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanization 
Prospects: The 2005 Revision Executive Summary [online 29 Oct 2007]. In 2005, the 
proportion of the population living in urban areas was 74 percent in more developed 
regions and 43 percent in less developed ones. By 2030, the rates are projected to be 
81 and 56 percent, respectively.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 2
19 Ibid., p. 4.
20 United Nations Human Settlement Programme, “New UN-Habitat report says urban 
dwellers badly off”, 19 June 2006 [online 29 Oct 2007].
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that do not reside in a slum.”21 In addition, a 2007 Small Arms Survey report 
found that large-scale and uncontrolled urbanization seems to be linked to in-
creased levels of armed violence, and that “urban armed violence is intimately 
connected to the structural dynamics of urbanization.”22
ThE SPREAD OF DISEASE
The increasingly urbanized populations in less developed regions allow for the 
rapid and efficient spread of disease among tightly populated areas. The State 
of the World’s Cities report found that HIV is higher in urban areas of sub-
Saharan Africa, in some cases twice that of rural areas.23 The DCDC report 
predicts the re-emergence “in strength” of some diseases, including tuberculosis, 
malaria and cholera. Along with HIV-AIDS, “the social, economic and human 
costs of contagious and communicable diseases will remain high and are likely 
to slow economic growth drastically in the worst affected regions for at least the 
first half of the period.”24 The United Nations reports that HIV-AIDS “poses a 
greater threat to development prospects in poor countries than any other dis-
ease. The impact is hardest among the poor, who have no economic cushion and 
the weakest social support of any group.”25 By killing young adults in their most 
productive economic period, the disease will not only create about 40 million 
orphans by 2010, but also cause extended families to lose their primary bread-
winners and thus perpetuate the cycle of poverty.26
ExISTING RESOURCE SCARCITy
Swelling populations in less developed regions place a greater strain on the most 
basic resources needed to sustain human life, including food and water. While 
some progress has certainly been made in increasing agricultural productivity, 
and some projections show an increase in the amount of arable land available 
for agriculture in developing countries, it remains a serious challenge to feed an 
increasing number of people. Ten years after the 1996 World Food Summit in 
Rome, which established the ambitious goal of reducing hunger to half the 1990 
levels by 2015, the total number of people in the developing world suffering 
from hunger has actually increased to 820 million.27 According to the UN’s Food 
21 Ibid.
22 Small Arms Survey, “Chapter 5 Summary: Guns in the City”, in Small Arms Survey 
2007 [online 29 Oct 2007].
23 Ibid.
24 DCDC, Global Strategic Trends, p. 7. 
25 United Nations Population Fund, State of the World Population 2002: People, Poverty 
and Possibilities, p. 43 [online 29 Oct 2007].
26 Ibid.
27 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “World Hunger 
Increasing”, FAO Newsroom, 30 October 2006 [online 29 Oct 2007]. Due to an 
even greater increase in population, however, the proportion of hungry people has 
decreased to 17 percent.
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), efforts to alleviate hunger should focus on 
agriculture and rural development.28 While global food supplies are sufficient to 
provide everyone with the minimum caloric requirements, there are political, so-
cial and economic challenges that prevent the access and distribution of food.29 
In some regions, overuse of the land itself is an issue, with erosion and saliniza-
tion limiting agricultural productivity.30 Consumption patterns can contribute to 
added pressure on agricultural production; the increased consumption of meat is 
one example, as livestock are mostly grain-fed.31
In particular, the FAO highlighted the use of irrigation as “essential to in-
creasing productivity,” stating that “without investment in irrigation, it will be 
difficult to increase food production, reduce the financial burden of agricultural 
imports and increase food security.”32 In this way, food security is closely tied to 
the availability of water. In the Near East and North Africa, for example, access 
to water resources act as a constraint to development and is a source of tension 
between the various groups of users.33 The 2006 Human Development Report 
highlighted water scarcity, noting that over one billion people have inadequate 
access to water, but it argued, as with hunger, that while “the availability of 
water is a concern for some countries … the scarcity at the heart of the global 
water crisis is rooted in power, poverty and inequality, not in physical avail-
ability.”34 Some regions, however, including North Africa, the Middle East and 
Central Asia, do in fact exhibit physical water scarcity, and a distinction must 
be made between physical scarcity and poor management regimes. It should 
also be noted that water supplies are affected by other trends, since increased 
population growth leads to increased demand for basic consumption as well as 
expanded irrigation to meet increased demands on food supplies.
STRONG RElIGIOUS AND EThNIC IDENTITIES
In 1994, a provocative essay appeared in the pages of Atlantic Monthly. A col-
lection of observations by traveling journalist Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming 
Anarchy” outlined a disturbing set of trends in the developing world. Kaplan 
intended to “remap the political earth the way it will be a few decades hence,” 
28 Ibid.
29 See Marc J. Cohen, Food Security: Vulnerability despite Abundance, Coping with 
Crisis Working Paper Series (New York: International Peace Academy, July 2007 
[online 29 Oct 2007]).
30 German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), Climate Change as a Security 
Threat (London: Earthscan, 2008) [online 15 Oct 2007], p. 95.
31 Ibid.
32 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Water and Food Security”, 
fact sheet, FAO Newsroom, 17 January 2001 [online 29 Oct 2007]. 
33 Ibid.
34 United Nations, Human Development Report 2006: Summary [online 21 Nov 2007], 
p. 10. 
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and saw a host of destabilizing elements, including “the increasing erosion of the 
nation-states and international borders.”35 Kaplan wrote: 
Everywhere in the developing world at the turn of the twenty-first century these 
new men and women, rushing into the cities, are remaking civilizations and 
redefining their identities in terms of religion and tribal ethnicity which do not 
coincide with the borders of existing states … Whereas rural poverty is age-old 
and almost a “normal” part of the social fabric, urban poverty is socially desta-
bilizing.36
The DCDC Global Strategic Trends report predicts an increased emphasis on 
personal identity and self-interest, and “nationhood and ethnicity, especially in 
ethnically homogenous and ideologically nationalistic states communities, will 
continue to exert a powerful emotional influence.”37 Conversely, “individual 
loyalty to the state and state institutions will become increasingly condition-
al.”38 The National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, Mapping the Global 
Future, predicts that “over the next 15 years, religious identity is likely to be-
come an increasingly important factor in how people define themselves. The 
trend toward identity politics is linked to increased mobility, growing diversity 
of hostile groups within states, and the diffusion of modern communications 
technologies.”39
According to the NIC report, religious adherents of all faiths have begun 
to demonstrate a deeper commitment to their beliefs, and many are becoming 
activists that advocate change in society. While the report acknowledges that 
“religious-based movements have been common in times of social and political 
turmoil in the past and have oftentimes been a force for positive change … the 
desire by activists groups to change society often leads to more social and politi-
cal turmoil, some of it violent.”40 The spread of radical Islam will be particu-
larly important, according to NIC, tapping into a sense of alienation from the 
globalized world among populations in Muslim countries, and a similar cultural 
estrangement among Muslims living in the West.41
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NON-STATE GROUPS AND ThE FUTURE OF WAR
While the asymmetrical threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups such as al-
Qaeda remains the focus of some countries, most notably the United States, 
armed groups have long been a destabilizing factor in some regions of the world. 
A report issued by the Small Arms Survey in 2004 provides an example of this 
development. The small and politically unstable Central African Republic suf-
fered from a series of coups d’état after its independence from France in 1960. 
After a failed coup attempt in 1982, significant amounts of small arms began 
flowing to non-state groups inside the country and, along with the involvement 
of neighboring governments, contributed to increased levels of violence and 
political instability. Currently, non-state groups “seriously outgun government 
forces” and “the state’s ability to regulate weapons among civilians is essentially 
non-existent.”42 Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan are other prominent examples 
of weak central governments clashing with powerful armed groups operating 
outside the authority of the state.
The DCDC report warns that “armed forces will operate alongside, in com-
petition with, and against, a variety of paramilitary groups and armed criminal 
gangs.”43 This meshes quite well with the writings of military theoreticians such 
as Martin van Creveld and Herfried Münkler, who describe a transformational 
process underway that has resulted in new types of war. In a recent article, 
Münkler outlined three general characteristics of these new wars. First, wars 
are being gradually privatized and states no longer hold a monopoly on waging 
war, and non-state and sub-state actors are increasingly the initiators. Second, a 
militarily asymmetrical form of fighting by “militarily inferior actors otherwise 
hardly fit for battle” has developed, or more correctly stated, has re-emerged af-
ter the historical anomaly of the industrial warfare that marked the 20th century. 
Third, Münkler argues that war has become demilitarized: regular armed forces 
have ceded their control and monopoly on warfare to irregular forces in such a 
way that dissolves the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. He 
notes that each of these characteristics was observable previously, but that “the 
new feature of the new wars lies in the simultaneous coincidence of all of the 
three main features described above.”44
FAIlING STATES AND POOR GOVERNANCE
Münkler’s third characteristic relates closely to the threat of failed states. While 
he argues that states have ceded their monopoly on waging war, a common 
42 Small Arms Survey, “The Central African Republic: A case study of small arms and 
conflict”, in Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk [online 20 Oct 2007], p. 11.
43 Ibid., p. 72.
44 Herfried Münkler, “What is really new about the new wars – a reply to the critics”, 
in John Andreas Olsen, ed., On New Wars, Oslo Files on Defence and Security no. 4 
(Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007). 
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definition of failed states is the loss of a state’s monopoly on the use of violence 
within its own territory.45 In measuring the degree of state failure, the US-based 
periodical Foreign Policy has created a ranking system to gauge failed states, 
which it characterizes as a state that has “lost physical control of its territory or 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, … the erosion of a legitimate authority 
to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, 
and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the interna-
tional community.”46 The Failed State Index utilizes 12 “indicators of insta-
bility” that measure demographic pressures, corruption, large-scale voluntary 
and involuntary migration, extent of citizen support, economic inequality, and 
institutionalized discrimination or persecution. The resulting list of weak gov-
ernments considered to be susceptible to state failure contains mostly developing 
countries in the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. 
Of the first 40 states listed on the 2007 Failed States Index as “critical” or “in 
danger”, only North Korea is located outside of these regions.47
Another characteristic worthy of concern is the distinct lack of good gover-
nance among countries in the regions mentioned above. According to the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, which chart key factors such as rule 
of law, levels of corruption, government effectiveness and political stability, there 
has been very little progress since 1996.48 The overall governance scores for de-
veloping countries in the African Sahel or Central Asia, for example, are consis-
tently in the bottom third globally and have shown no real signs of improvement 
over the past decade. This lack of governance capacity reduces these countries’ 
ability to handle crises, avert violence associated with dissatisfied populations, 
and ensure overall human security.
In 1994, Vice President Al Gore set up the State Failure Task Force that 
examined the regional, religious, ethnic, environmental and economic factors 
leading to state failure. For the study group, instances of state failure included 
revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes or genocides and politi-
cides. Its main findings, delivered in a report from 2000, concluded that “the 
strongest influence on the risk of state failure was regime type. All other things 
being equal, we found the odds of failure to be seven times as high for partial 
45 Such states may also be defined as “failed” or “failing”, though such binary 
terminology (failed versus successful) may not necessarily reflect the scope and degree 
of state control seen in countries. For a good conceptual and theoretical discussion 
of failed states, see Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, “The Theory of Failure and the Failure of 
Theory: ‘State Failure’ in Theory and Practice” (Peace Research Institute, Oslo [online 
5 Nov 2007]).
46 “The Failed State Index 2007”, Foreign Policy, July/August 2007 [online 30 Oct 
2007].
47 Ibid.
48 World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996–2006”, Governance Matters 
2007 [online 10 Nov 2007].
democracies as they were for full democracies and autocracies.”49 Other impor-
tant factors included poverty (“low levels of material well-being”), low levels of 
international trade and the presence of conflicts in several bordering states.
CONNECTING ThE TRENDS: hUMAN SECURITy IN ThE “ARC OF INSTAbIlITy”
These interrelated trends (poverty, population growth, urbanization, disease, 
resource stresses, strong religious or ethnic identity, armed groups, new war-
fare trends, weak governments and poor governance) are generally character-
istics of the less developed regions of the world. Each of these factors might be 
more manageable in isolation, but the synergy created by multiple insecurity-
producing factors leads to an exceptionally destabilizing and violent situation. If 
one compares the regions most affected by each of these trends, as mentioned in 
the introduction, the geographic overlap is substantial. Instability may therefore 
spill over from one state to the next. Some of these factors need not be inherently 
destabilizing – for example, urbanization or strong ethnic ties could be beneficial 
trends – but their co-existence with other pressures increases the likelihood of 
these factors exerting a negative influence. 
It soon becomes abundantly clear that the cumulative destabilizing effect of 
these social, economic and environmental factors are most prevalent in exactly 
the regions least prepared to deal with their negative consequences. Growing 
populations and urbanization require long-term planning and regulations, food 
production and water distribution are dependent on institutions recognized as 
legitimate and authoritative, administrative efficacy requires transparent and 
equitable transactions, and improvements in the general security within a state 
relies on that state having a monopoly on the use of force within its borders. 
Without basic tools of governance, the combined effect of these factors becomes 
one of general instability throughout the developing world. As the NIC report 
states:
Lagging economies, ethnic affiliations, intense religious convictions and youth 
bulges will align to create a perfect storm, creating conditions likely to spawn in-
ternal conflict. The governing capacity of states, however, will determine wheth-
er and to what extent conflicts actually occur. Those states unable both to satisfy 
the expectations of their peoples and to resolve or quell conflicting demands 
among them are likely to encounter the most severe and most frequent out-
breaks of violence. For the most part, those states most susceptible to violence 
are in a great arc of instability from Sub-Saharan Africa, through North Africa, 
into the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and South and Central Asia and 
49 State Failure Task Force, State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings, Center 
for Global Policy (George Mason University [online 21 Nov 2007]), p. vi.
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through parts of Southeast Asia. Countries in these regions are generally those 
“behind” the globalization curve.50
The DCDC Global Strategic Trends report also highlighted the risk of political 
instability in these regions, noting that the Middle East shows signs of tension 
with high birth rates, weak economic prospects and region-wide political insta-
bility. The report also viewed Africa as particularly worrisome: “environmental 
stress, demographic pressure and political instability will continue to threaten 
major upheaval, the effects of which will include mass migration, humanitarian 
crises, international crime and potentially, international terrorism.”51
The common theme emerging from the preceding discussion of destabiliz-
ing trends is that of the threat or risk to human security. The negative conse-
quences relating to each of the factors listed above threatens the health, safety 
and well-being of the individual at a more basic level than they do the state. 
While many of the factors do have ramifications for state survival, as the Failed 
State Index demonstrates, these may be seen mainly as a consequence of internal 
crisis or volatility – of decreasing personal security. While interstate conflict may 
arise from growing competition over resources or mass migration, the primary 
risks emanating from these destabilizing trends are to individuals.  
The concept of human security reflects more accurately the risks inherent 
in these trends in a way that the traditional concept of security cannot. Before 
the effects of climate change upon these underlying risks to human security are 
analyzed, a summary of the actual direct impacts of climate change upon the en-
vironment will be presented. The IPCC report represents the most widely agreed 
upon source for such a discussion, and it should be noted that while climate 
change will have ramifications for the entire planet, only those areas included in 
the Arc of Instability will be highlighted here.
50 NIC, Mapping the Global Future, p. 97.
51 DCDC, Global Strategic Trends, p. 53.
The direct effects of climate change: IPCC panel report
In 1896, a Swedish chemist named Svante August Arrhenius published “On the 
Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground”. 
In this paper, he explained how carbon dioxide and water together in the atmo-
sphere create a “hothouse” effect by trapping the sun’s heat. Arrhenius, winner 
of the 1903 Nobel Prize for chemistry, also understood that the burning of fossil 
fuels added to this effect by adding carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, though 
he predicted it would be thousands of years before any noticeable effects were 
seen. In a darkly comic twist, Arrhenius suggested a positive aspect of global 
warming: “We may hope to enjoy ages with more equable and better climates, 
especially as regards to the colder regions of the Earth.”52 
One hundred and eleven years later, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a 1,572-page report on the subject, 
prepared by over 200 scientists and including a 21-page summary endorsed by 
officials from over 120 countries. In its fourth report, the panel concluded that 
the earth’s climate has already been irreversibly altered by the build-up of green-
house gases, and that humans have been the main cause of warming over the 
past fifty years.53 Three studies were released in 2007, covering the basic science 
of climate change, the effects of the warming, and possible options for reducing 
emissions. As the panel releases such reports about every six years, these three 
comprehensive reports will become the reference points for policy creation for 
some time.54 As the IPCC report can be said to represent the latest and most 
broadly accepted data on the subject, the 21-page summary will serve here as the 
principle reference point regarding the likely direct effects of climate change.
Since its last report in 2001, the IPCC panel has been able to utilize a great-
er number of studies providing observations of the environment and changes 
related to climate change, as well as an improvement in data quality. The panel 
notes, however, a distinct lack of observed data from developing countries. Nev-
ertheless, the substantial amount of data has allowed scientists to more confi-
dently evaluate both the observed changes and their impacts than was previ-
ously possible. 
52 “Global Warming: From Theory to Fact”, National Public Radio, 21 May 2007 
[online 23 October 2007].
53 James Kanter and Andrew C. Revkin, “Scientists Detail Climate Changes, Poles to 
Tropics”, New York Times, 7 April 2007 [online 23 October 2007].
54 Ibid.
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ObSERVED ClIMATE ChANGES AND IPCC CONClUSIONS55
The evidence shows that all continents and oceans are clearly being affected 
by regional climate changes, more specifically by temperature increases. From 
over 29,000 observational data series taken from 75 studies showing signifi-
cant change in physical and biological systems, “more than 89% of them are 
consistent with the direction of change expected as a response to warming.”56 
The panel concluded that the increase in global temperature since 1950 is “very 
likely” caused by the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations, and that it was 
“very unlikely” to be a result of natural temperature variations. 
Evidence of climate change has appeared in numerous regions and eco-
systems. The number and size of glacial lakes are expanding, and permafrost 
regions are increasingly unstable, with increased rock avalanches in mountain-
ous regions. Glacier- and snow-fed rivers have increased run-off and their maxi-
mum flows occur earlier in the spring, while lakes and rivers in many regions 
are becoming warmer. Spring arrives earlier along with its associated events: 
leaf-unfolding, bird migration and egg-laying. The geographic range of plant 
and animal species has shifted towards the poles, and there are similar shifts in 
sea-life such as plankton and fish species. The rising temperatures are beginning 
to have an effect on the earth’s ecosystems. Agricultural and forestry patterns in 
the Northern Hemisphere are already changing, along with some aspects relat-
ing to human health, including altered disease patterns and heat-related mortal-
ity rates in Europe. In parts of Africa, the growing season has been shortened 
due to warmer, drier conditions and uncertain rainfall. Sea-level rise, combined 
with human development, threatens coastal wetlands and mangroves, thereby 
increasing the damage from coastal flooding. 
PROjECTED IMPACTS OF UNMITIGATED ClIMATE ChANGE
The management of freshwater resources will become increasingly challenging 
as water availability increases by 10–40 percent at high latitudes and some wet 
tropical areas, while decreasing 10–30 percent in mid-latitude dry areas and the 
dry tropics. The panel predicts an increase in drought-affected areas, while heavy 
precipitation will increase flood risk. Declining glacial mass and snow cover will 
reduce water availability to those dependent on the melt-water from mountain-
ous regions. Higher temperatures will lead to higher evapo-transpiration rates 
and therefore further water loss, and the higher water temperatures will likely 
cause water quality problems such as increased algae growth. Increased rainfall 
55 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers” in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation 
and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, 
J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press [online 5 Oct 2007]), p. 7–22. This overview closely follows the text 
and structure of the IPCC summary.
56  Ibid., p. 9.
in some areas will likely cause soil erosion and “water logging” of the soil, along 
with the risk of groundwater contamination. On the other hand, increased rain-
fall will reduce water shortages in some areas.
On balance, crop productivity will decline due to climate change. While 
productivity will likely increase in higher latitudes with a rise in mean tempera-
ture of one to three degrees Celsius, it will eventually decrease. In seasonally dry 
and tropic regions, productivity will decrease even with less dramatic tempera-
ture increases of one to two degrees Celsius. Droughts and floods in these re-
gions will adversely affect agricultural production, especially that of subsistence 
farming. The lower crop yields will likely lead to increased livestock deaths. At 
higher latitudes, cereal production will increase along with commercial timber 
productivity.
Climate change and the associated rise in sea level will negatively impact 
coastal areas. Risks to coastal regions from sea-level rise, including coastal ero-
sion, will be exacerbated by human-related activity. The panel predicts “many 
millions more people” will be affected by flooding due to sea-level rise before 
the turn of the century, especially in densely populated and low-lying areas. The 
mega-deltas of Asia and Africa will account for the largest numbers affected, 
and adaptation will be most difficult for developing countries. The sea-level rise 
will likely increase the salinization of irrigation water and freshwater systems, 
thereby reducing the amount of usable water available.
Societal costs will be substantial as well and, although impacts will vary, the 
net “effects will tend to be more negative the larger the change in climate.”57 Set-
tlements in coastal and river flood plains, especially those with climate-sensitive 
economies, will be at risk. Due to complex economic and social linkages, less af-
fected areas will also feel the effects of extreme weather and flooding. The panel 
suggests that climate change will likely lead to increases in malnutrition, disease 
and deaths relating to natural phenomena such as heat waves, floods, storms, 
fires and droughts.
PROjECTED IMPACTS IN AFRICA AND ASIA58
According to the IPCC, “Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to cli-
mate variability and change because of multiple stresses and low adaptive capac-
ity.”59 Stress on water supplies will affect between 75 and 250 million people by 
the year 2020, especially if reduced water supplies coincide with increased de-
mand. Agricultural production and access to food will be negatively affected by 
climate change due to reduced arable land, shorter growing seasons and lower 
57 Ibid., p.12. 
58 As the focus in this study is on the convergence of climate change impacts, human 
security and US national security, only those regions most relevant to that focus will be 
summarized from the IPCC report.
59 Ibid., p. 13.
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yields. The report warns that “in some countries, yields from rain-fed agricul-
ture could be reduced by up to 50 percent by 2020.”60 Rising temperatures in 
large lakes will negatively impact fisheries there, while the loss of mangroves and 
coral reefs will threaten fisheries in coastal areas. 
In Asia, water resources will be substantially affected as the Himalayan 
glaciers melt. The immediate consequence of this will be increased flooding and 
rock avalanches over the next few decades, followed by decreased freshwater 
availability in Central, South, East, and Southeast Asia as the glaciers recede. 
Coupled with population growth and increased demand, more than one billion 
people may be affected by the 2050s. As in Africa, coastal areas in Asia will be at 
risk, especially the mega-deltas of South, East, and Southeast Asia. Crop yields 
are projected to rise up to 20 percent in East and Southeast Asia, while falling 
up to 30 percent in Central and South Asia by the mid 21st century. Deaths from 
disease related to droughts and floods will rise, including an increased risk of 
cholera. 
RESPONDING TO ClIMATE ChANGE
The warnings from the IPCC report are clear: the impacts from climate change 
are likely to increase as the global mean temperature increases. According to the 
panel, “although many early impacts of climate change can be effectively ad-
dressed through adaptation, the options for successful adaptation diminish and 
the associated costs increase with increasing climate change.”61 Several types of 
adaptation are mentioned in the report: technological (sea defenses), behavioral 
(changing food and recreational choices), managerial (changing farming prac-
tices) and policy (regulations). Regardless, “adaptation alone is not expected to 
cope with all the projected effects of climate change, and especially not over the 
long run as most impacts increase in magnitude.”62
The IPCC report expresses concern over the increased vulnerability of 
some regions to the impacts of climate change due to other stress factors. It 
notes that “vulnerable regions face multiple stresses that affect their exposure 
and sensitivity as well as their capacity to adapt. These stresses arise from, for 
example, current climate hazards, poverty and unequal access to resources, food 
insecurity, trends in economic globalization, conflict and incidence of disease 
such as HIV/AIDS.”63 Near the end of the IPCC’s summary comes the panel’s 
warning against inaction:
Even the most stringent mitigation efforts cannot avoid further impacts 
of climate change in the next few decades, which makes adaptation essential, 
particularly in addressing the near-term impacts. Unmitigated climate change 
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 19.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 20.
would, in the long term, be likely to exceed the capacity of natural, managed 
and human systems to adapt.
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Climate change, conflict and security
How will climate change affect human security? The academic research aimed 
at identifying the root causes of armed conflict covers a broad swath of the 
international relations literature, to which the exploration of linkages between 
environmental factors and conflict belongs. The academic literature on envi-
ronment, conflict and cooperation (EEC) is highly charged with controversy: 
disagreements seem to abound on nearly all aspects of research, including the 
conceptualization of “security”, methodology and initial assumptions regard-
ing scarcity, just to name a few. Any overview of the field will necessarily over-
simplify and lack the proper nuances, and any comprehensive study of current 
trends would constitute a lengthy piece of writing on its own. The intention here 
is simply to outline the contours in order to make some observations about the 
connectedness of certain trends64 
At its core, environmental security deals with the problem of scarcity, es-
pecially shortages in food or access to water. There appear to be at least five 
distinct views regarding scarcity and conflict.65 The neo-Malthusian view, taking 
its name from the 18th century scholar Thomas R. Malthus who suggested that 
populations would eventually outgrow their food supply, begins with the initial 
assumption that resource scarcity will lead to conflict. Cornucopians take the op-
posite view, assuming that advancements in technology and market mechanisms 
will overcome any impending shortages. A related position, the political ecology 
view, argues that the key to resource management lies in the social, economic 
and political aspects of resource distribution. An institutionalist viewpoint relies 
on cooperation through agreements and institutions to avoid conflicts, while 
those examining the resource curse point to resource abundance (diamonds, 
timber), rather than scarcity, as a source of conflict.
Perhaps the most pervasive of these various approaches to environmental 
security has been the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon, whose work most closely 
resembles the neo-Malthusian view. In a 1991 article, Homer-Dixon proposed 
three “ideal” types of conflicts that might arise from environmental degrada-
tion.66 Simple scarcity conflicts can arise when state actors perceive resource 
scarcity, especially renewable resources such as river water, fish, or agriculturally 
productive land, in a zero-sum manner and seek to gain physical control over 
them. Such conflicts may also be self-perpetuating, in that conflicts over farm-
land may lead to reduced food production and therefore increased food scar-
city. Mass-migrations of populations due to environmental change may lead to 
64 This task is approached with the utmost humility and with apologies to those 
researchers specializing in the various fields that are perhaps somewhat clumsily 
summarized here.
65 This typology is taken from a lecture by Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Environmental security 
and conflict”, lecture 13 March 2007 (GWSP [online 2 Nov 2007]).
66 Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of 
Acute Conflict”, International Security, vol. 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991): 76–116. 
group-identity conflicts when, wrote Homer-Dixon, “ethnic and cultural groups 
are propelled together under circumstances of deprivation and stress, we should 
expect inter-group hostility.”67 A third type of conflict can occur as a result 
of inequitable distribution of economic goods among a society’s citizens, or a 
“widening gap between their actual level of economic achievement and the level 
they feel they deserve.”68 This causes what Homer-Dixon refers to as relative-
deprivation conflicts; this phenomenon may be most affected by the rate of eco-
nomic deterioration – the quicker the downturn, the greater the discontent.
The effects of climate change may be seen as an accelerant to the processes 
discussed by Homer-Dixon and others. Whether one adopts a neo-Malthusian 
view or one of institutionalized cooperation, the fact remains that changing 
weather patterns and global warming will likely create new stresses on the en-
vironment and therefore on those populations that are most vulnerable to such 
variations. While environmental conflicts have and will continue to occur, climate 
change has increased the odds of such conflicts simply by negatively impacting 
the underlying factors that cause them. In the next section, four types of possible 
conflict “constellations” resulting from climate change will be examined. 
The following section relies primarily on the impressively thorough analy-
sis conducted by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), 
which released its findings in the report Climate Change as a Security Risk.69 It 
must be mentioned that this report includes many possible avenues for coopera-
tion between states in dealing with the adverse affects of climate change. This 
study will make use only of the possible conflict constellations directly relevant 
to the discussion at hand. The stresses of climate change are not necessarily 
destined to provoke conflict. This section merely presents the possible sources 
of violence and notes the disturbing confluence of negative trends in the regions 
under discussion.
WATER SCARCITy AND CONFlICT
There is little documentation showing that water scarcity alone leads to con-
flict, but it does suggest that scarcity can combine with other factors to create 
violence. It must also be noted that disagreements over water usage have led to 
international water resource benefit-sharing agreements and regulatory regimes. 
However, if climate change leads to substantially less rainfall and reduced re-
serve capacity in the form of mountain snow and glaciers, water availability may 
fall to unseen levels for which there are no historical data. Upstream countries 
may feel obliged to depart from their obligations under existing treaties, and re-
tain greater amounts of water for crop production and other uses. Downstream 
67 Ibid.: 108.
68 Ibid.: 109.
69 WGBU, Climate Change as a Security Threat.
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countries may be forced to either accept the agreement-breaking actions of up-
stream countries or take action to secure water access for their own citizens. As 
the WBGU study observed, “few agreements have so far been made to promote 
adaptive responses to increasing regional water scarcity, in other words agree-
ments in the sense of burden-sharing instead of benefit-sharing.”70
On the whole, intrastate conflicts over water are seen to be more likely 
than conflicts between states. As temperatures rise and changing weather pat-
terns cause drier conditions, farmers will be forced to make greater use of irri-
gation techniques and therefore increase water demand. Potential conflicts may 
arise from either an insufficient supply of water or supplies of insufficient qual-
ity, especially as water quality may decrease as scarcity rises. Conflicts can occur 
between user groups, herders and farmers being the best-known example. There 
are those who argue that the current violence in Darfur, while containing tribal 
or ethnic factors, also can be seen as a land-use conflict exacerbated by climate 
change.71 In addition, shortages in water supply may aggravate existing social 
strife and accentuate societal inequalities as certain groups retain access to water 
while others are denied it.
FOOD ShORTAGES AND CONFlICT
Closely related to water scarcity is the risk of food shortages. As the IPCC report 
projects, changing weather patterns will likely cause drier conditions, shorter 
growing seasons, and lower crop yields. A paper by the International Peace 
Academy warned that “climate change poses an ominous threat to food secu-
rity over the medium- and long-term … it will likely create greater emergency 
food aid needs in the future. It poses a serious threat to the livelihoods of small 
farmers, who are already vulnerable to food insecurity, as it may reduce tropical 
farm yields substantially.”72 As sea levels rise and possibly contaminate water 
tables with salt water, less freshwater may then available for irrigation. Similar 
to water use, the possible conflicts over land use loom large. Profitable land-use 
forms, such as growing bio-fuel sources or timber, may challenge agricultural 
land use and create conflict, just as conflicts may arise between farmers and 
nomadic herders. Rising seawater temperatures may contribute to vanishing fish 
stocks, and coral bleaching will destroy the habitat of other fish species, both ef-
fects resulting in less fish stocks available for consumption. As fish provide good 
sources of nourishment requiring neither grazing land nor grain production, dis-
appearing fisheries place increased pressure on higher-impact sources of food.
Demographic trends, urbanization in particular, have a role to play in the 
link between food shortages and conflict. Studies have shown a higher frequency 
70 Ibid., p. 84.
71 “Sudan: Climate change only one cause among many for Darfur conflict”, Reuters 
AlertNet, 28 June 2007 [online 10 Nov 2007].
72 Marc Cohen, Food Security, p. 11.
of violent riots due to food shortages in urban areas than in rural ones. As with 
water scarcity, an inequitable distribution of food may also lead to violence and 
conflict. As the WBGU report noted, one study revealed that “if the majority of 
the population is hungry while a small minority remains almost unaffected by 
food shortages, outbreaks of violence are more likely than if the entire popula-
tion is negatively affected.”73 Those societies already experiencing destabilizing 
trends are among those most vulnerable to outbreaks of violence that “‘boil 
over’ or that relatively localized violence might expand on an uncontrollable 
scale. Furthermore, the pre-existence of (violent) conflicts increases the prob-
ability that environmental changes will result in declining food production and, 
subsequently, food crises.”74
NATURAl DISASTERS AND CONFlICT
The IPCC report projects some increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme 
weather events, especially with regard to tropical storms in the Atlantic, Pacific 
and Indian Oceans. These storms contain powerful winds that can damage or 
destroy structures, heavy precipitation that may result in swollen rivers that 
flood their banks, and an associated storm surge that can send seawater over 
low-lying areas adjacent to the coast. Approximately two-thirds of the world’s 
population lives in coastal areas, noted one study, “where critically important 
facilities and infrastructure, such as transportation routes, industrial facilities, 
port facilities and energy production and distribution facilities are located.”75 It 
is also common to find cities located on river estuaries, which serve to connect 
marine transport network with inland waterways. As these settlements serve 
as logistics centers for transporting goods further inland, the potential loss of 
this economic link can have far-reaching consequences beyond the areas directly 
impacted by severe weather. As the IPCC report suggested, these important eco-
nomic centers are extremely vulnerable to the effects of severe weather.
On a purely practical level, severe weather can cause substantial loss of 
human life, destroy dwellings and overwhelm sanitation infrastructure. The 
devastation from such storms may render portions of a city completely unin-
habitable due to structural damage, flooding, or the threat of rapidly spreading 
waterborne disease. Disasters can be said to cause disruption and instability at a 
most fundamental level. Storm surges can cause contaminated groundwater and 
ruin croplands due to the high saline content in sea water.76
73 German Advisory Council on Global Change, Climate Change as a Security Risk 
(London: Earthscan, 2008) [online 15 Oct 2007], p. 98.
74 Ibid., p. 99.
75 The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Corporation, National Security and the Threat 
of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2007) [online 1 Nov 
2007], p. 16.
76 Ibid. 
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73 German Advisory Council on Global Change, Climate Change as a Security Risk 
(London: Earthscan, 2008) [online 15 Oct 2007], p. 98.
74 Ibid., p. 99.
75 The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Corporation, National Security and the Threat 
of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2007) [online 1 Nov 
2007], p. 16.
76 Ibid. 
32 OSlO FIlES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITy 6/2007 FORECASTINg CRISIS
As the WBGU study pointed out, natural disasters can cause state functions 
to be temporarily suspended when the resources of local and national authori-
ties are overwhelmed. Significantly, the state’s inability to respond properly and 
assist its citizens in a disaster situation comes at precisely the time when they are 
most dependent upon governmental support. Frustration and resentment with 
the ruling government may arise when relief efforts are inadequate or ineffec-
tive.77 After a disaster strikes, communities are at their most vulnerable. Even in 
highly developed countries, natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (2005) 
demonstrated how quickly these situations can lead to a breakdown in govern-
mental response as well as an acute loss of security.78 
Under these stressful circumstances, existing social or political tensions 
may be aggravated and escalate into intrastate conflicts. Such violence will likely 
be perpetuated by smaller groups rather than an organized resistance or rebel 
group, as the organizational challenges facing governmental agencies following 
a disaster will likely hinder the organizational capabilities of opposition groups 
as well.79 Haiti may be seen as one example of how pre-existing weak state 
structures and social tensions can lead to longer-term state instability after a 
natural disaster.80
MIGRATION AND CONFlICT
Both the likely and possible consequences of climate change mentioned above 
will result in the movement of people away from affected areas. These migra-
tions may be stimulated either by direct environmental impacts that cause some 
regions to be rendered uninhabitable or by social developments resulting from 
these environmental changes. Regardless of the cause, the movement of people 
en masse creates an inherently unstable situation, presenting risks to the mi-
grants themselves, the regions they travel through, and the areas receiving large 
numbers of migrants. The most likely causes for such movements will be briefly 
examined as well as the potential for instability, violence and conflict.
Sea levels rose an unprecedented 15–20 cm during the 20th century, and 
scientists have concluded that global warming is the reason behind this phenom-
enon. Increasing temperatures are causing substantial flows of melt water from 
ice sheets and glaciers. The effects of the additional flows are compounded by 
the warming of the oceans, as the thermal expansion of the water itself causes a 
sea-level increase. The IPCC projects a global rise of 50 cm by the end of the cen-
tury while other studies warn of even greater increases; in the next two centuries 
77 German Advisory Council on Global Change, Climate Change as a Security Risk, p. 
105.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p. 106.
80 Ibid., p. 107.
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a rise of several meters is likely.81 Rising sea levels are expected to permanently 
flood low-lying coastal regions, covering residential areas, economic centers and 
agricultural land. As mentioned in the previous section, a substantial portion of 
the world’s population resides near the coast, and coastal cities are major eco-
nomic and political centers. The loss of these population centers will necessarily 
lead to mass migrations to other population centers located inland. 
There are other direct effects of climate change that may cause migration. 
The increased frequency and intensity of tropical storms will bring with it an 
increased risk of storm surge. The damage caused by the storm itself may be 
compounded by flooding due to the temporary localized rise in sea levels. Low-
lying residential areas will be affected, and salt water will harm agricultural 
land. Some of the expected impacts of climate change – desertification, increased 
stress on water resources and reduced agricultural production – may also cause 
large-scale migration as populations abandon regions that are less able to sus-
tain human settlements. People may escape to nearby urban areas in search of 
basic necessities as well as employment. Each of these eventualities can lead 
to mass migration; their combined effect makes the possibility of such migra-
tions even more likely. In addition to these direct causes of mass migration, the 
increased risk of violence and instability in regions adversely affected by the 
factors listed above may also create new waves of migration as populations flee 
conflict-filled areas.
There exists the risk of violence linked to the influx of migrants escaping 
from environmentally related situations. Some researchers point to conflicts re-
sulting from sizeable movements of people that occur in a disorderly fashion, or 
if these immigrants must compete with the resident populations for basic goods 
such as food, water, shelter, employment or social services.82 Migrants escaping 
environmental disasters may present less of a destabilizing element than refugees 
from conflict areas, as they most likely lack clear political objectives or a person-
al interest in political developments in their homeland, and cannot be described 
as aggrieved parties seeking justice or retribution.83 States with the resources at 
their disposal to accommodate large numbers of immigrants will be best able 
to avoid destabilizing effects, and states with organizational capabilities at the 
local governmental level are better able to respond to the increased demand for 
immediate and basic needs such as electricity, housing, water and sanitation.84
81 Ibid., p. 61.
82 Ibid., p. 121; Nils Petter Gleditsch, Ragnhild Nordås and Idean Salehyan, Climate 
Change and Conflict: The Migration Link, Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series 
(New York: International Peace Academy, May 2007 [online 17 Nov 2007]). 
83 Gleditsch et.al, Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link. 
84 Ibid., p. 7.
SyNERGy: ClIMATE ChANGE AND UNDERlyING RISkS
Just as the underlying risks to human security highlighted earlier are intercon-
nected in ways that compound and exacerbate the trends, a similar synergy 
is found between those underlying risks and the challenges posed by climate 
change outlined above. Were the most dramatic effects of global climate change 
to fall on the most developed countries in the world, the risks might be substan-
tial but controllable. Tragically, the projections show the worst-affected areas to 
be precisely those regions least capable of coping with the consequences in terms 
of governance or financial resources. 
As the above overview of climate change impacts has shown, violence and 
conflicts are most likely to erupt in areas with pre-existing social or political 
tensions, or in countries where governmental functions are unable to cope with 
the challenges presented by climate change. This pattern of adding additional 
stresses to those regions already under stress makes the risks of climate change 
particularly worrisome. That destabilization in one country can spread across 
an entire region also becomes a very real possibility, considering such interlock-
ing trends in close proximity to one another. The DCDC Global Strategic Trends 
report has presented these interconnected trends in map format; notably, those 
areas seen as multiple stress zones are consistent with the NIC report’s descrip-
tion of an “arc of instability”.
The projected effects of climate change represent a substantial degradation 
of those environmental conditions usually linked to the potential for conflict. 
Previous research has examined occurrences of both interstate and intrastate 
conflict stemming from factors such as resource scarcity or migration. While 
these provide valuable insight, the likely effects of climate change present steadi-
ly negative trends that will not be reversible, in contrast to cyclical droughts, 
temporary flooding, or conflict-induced migration that eventually experience a 
pendulum swing toward conditions more suitable to human survivability. The 
scale and severity of the environmental conditions associated with such climate 
change impacts as rising sea levels, persistent drought, disappearing glaciers, 
and decreased growing seasons cannot be properly evaluated as no precedent 
exists for these extreme developments. 
Mass migration represents one likely outcome of climate change impacts, 
and is a factor that interacts negatively with the underlying urbanization trends. 
These migrants will most likely relocate from their now uninhabitable or unde-
sirable homelands to urban areas where the chances of securing basic daily needs 
will be greatest. In doing so, they will increase the strain on already strained 
urbanized areas. With little financial wealth, these new immigrants will likely 
end up in urban slums where human security is at its lowest and competition 
for limited resources is highest. As mentioned earlier, outbreaks of violence and 
riots over food scarcity are more common in urban areas than rural ones, both 
reinforcing and aggravating the risk to human security.
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Food and water scarcity, along with the potential risk of competition and 
conflict over shortages in these fundamental resources, place much greater pres-
sures on governmental structures to distribute limited resources in an equitable 
manner, especially considering that inequitable distribution has been shown to 
cause violence. Potential increases in population due to climate-change-induced 
migration will compound both the size and scope of the problem, further strain-
ing governmental agencies. In many countries located in the most susceptible 
regions, efficient governmental structures are sorely lacking. While it is possible 
that these countries might suddenly find ways to become more effective in the 
event of a crisis, a more plausible outcome may be that such agencies would 
become overwhelmed. As one study on migration and conflict notes, “changes 
in current policies are likely to be costly in the short-term – particularly for eco-
nomic actors who have an interest in maintaining the status quo – and political 
leaders may not be willing to make the necessary changes now in order to avert 
future dilemmas.”85
The Failed State Index presented earlier pinpoints those countries most 
at risk of internal collapse. The added strains on governmental agencies due to 
migration, urbanization, and food and water scarcity may push states to the 
point of collapse. The inability of the state to provide for the equitable distribu-
tion of basic resources may combine with other underlying trends. Without the 
state providing adequate resources or security, sub-state militant groups, per-
haps formed along ethnic or religious lines, may act to secure access to food and 
water for their followers through the use of force. The development of warlords 
in states with weak central power structures is not new, and such groups have 
easy access to small arms. This trend in turn may be reinforced by yet another 
trend: the development of privatized new wars, asymmetrical and blurring the 
boundaries between warriors and organized criminals. Such developments pose 
a substantial threat to the internal stability of a state and its ability to retain a 
monopoly on violence inside its borders – the lack of which is the very definition 
of a failed state.
COUNTERPOINT: ChAllENGING ThE ClIMATE ChANGE–CONFlICT lINk
While the arguments above seem both logical and plausible, a number of re-
searchers are disturbed by the increasing tendency to assume a causal link be-
tween climate change and conflict. Some point to inconclusive research data or 
faulty methodology, while at the same time pointing out some trends toward 
resource-sharing cooperation rather than conflict.86 Researcher Idean Salehyan 
warned of the “new myth about climate change” in a 2007 Foreign Policy piece, 
85 Ibid., p. 10.
86 See, for example Ben Buckland, “A Climate of War? Stopping the Securitization of 
Global Climate Change”, June 2007 (Geneva: International Peace Bureau [online 16 
Nov 2007]).
railing against “dire scenarios” similar those presented here as “... misleading. 
Even worse, they are irresponsible, for they shift liability for wars and human 
rights abuses away from oppressive corrupt governments.”87 
Classifying these dangers as human security risks is not simply an academic 
debate over terminology, because identifying the type of security threat has real 
implications for drafting policy responses. The debate surrounding the concept 
of “security” therefore becomes highly relevant. Many researchers focusing on 
the links between the environment and conflict are loath to apply the tradi-
tional understanding of security to the risks connected to climate change. As Jon 
Barnett wrote, “understanding climate change as a security issue risks making it 
a military rather than a foreign policy problem, and a sovereignty rather than a 
global commons problem.”88 Salehyan echoed this argument, writing that “fo-
cusing on climate change as a security threat that requires a military response 
diverts attention away from prudent adaptation mechanisms and new technolo-
gies that can prevent the worst catastrophes.”89
The WBGU report struck a similarly cautious tone, arguing that one risk 
in taking a broad comprehensive approach to security makes it “possible for 
new military interventions, including so-called pre-emptive wars, to be justified 
under the guise of comprehensive security. Such a trend may even lead ultimately 
to greater insecurity.”90 Finally, a United Nations paper argued that 
while human security enables the consideration of multiple threats, distortions 
can arise through securitizing threats that do not apply to the target population. 
This may include making overwhelming military force the main mechanism for 
achieving human security – an approach unlikely to fall within the norms of a 
human development approach.91 
Some scholars maintain that only cooperative efforts and institutions should be 
considered as options for coping with the effects of climate change.92
87 Idean Salehyan, “The New Myth about Climate Change” Foreign Policy August 2007 
[online 14 Nov 2007].
88 Jon Barnett, Security and Climate Change, Tyndal Centre Working Paper No. 7, 
October 2001, p. 11 [online 3 Nov 2007].
89 Salehyan, “The New Myth about Climate Change”.
90 German Advisory Council on Global Change, Climate Change as a Security Risk, p. 
20.
91 Richard Jolly and Deepayan Basu Ray, The Human Security Framework and National 
Human Development Reports, NHDR Occasional Paper 5 (New York: United Nations 
Development Programme, May 2006 [online 22 Nov 2007]), p. 11.
92 For one example, see Ben Buckland, “A Climate of War: Stopping the securitisation of 
Global Climate Change”, International Peace Bureau, Geneva, June 2007 [online 19 
Nov 2007].
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3 OSlO FIlES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITy
COMPlEx RISkS TO hUMAN SECURITy
The impacts projected from climate change pose some serious traditional secu-
rity threats to some states. The possibility of interstate conflict is a real one – dis-
agreements over the distribution of scarce resources may lead to violence and 
internal conflicts. This study suggests that while climate change by itself may 
not directly cause outbreaks of violence, it certainly exacerbates existing po-
litical and societal tensions and increases the possibility for inter- or intra-state 
conflicts. Many of the studies mentioned above note that while environmental 
factors were not the main conflict trigger, they combined with or worsened other 
existing factors. The State Failure Task Force came to this conclusion, stating 
that while no direct relationship was found between instances of state failure 
and environmental factors, it was one of the possible contributing factors.93 
Nonetheless, the greatest risks posed by climate change are those impacting 
human security. Existing trends that pose substantial risks to human security are 
compounded by the effects of climate change, and will make it increasingly dif-
ficult to secure access to the most basic of needs. In general, the risks described 
in the preceding sections combine to directly impact all seven sub-sections of the 
original 1994 human security concept: food, health, economic, environmental, 
personal, community and political security. 
Through a discussion of United States security policy, the next section will 
demonstrate that those regions most vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
have also been identified as of increasing strategic relevance to US policymakers 
and strategists. While the US has not explicitly stated its intention to focus on 
human security in these regions, it is clear that a shift in strategic thinking has 
been underway and is consistent with previous US policies. Historically, the US 
has taken a broad approach to its national interests, incorporating idealistic ele-
ments for both altruistic and instrumental purposes. The basic components of 
US strategy will now be presented, elements that are fundamental in nature and 
have relevance regardless of the occupant of the White House.
93 State Failure Task Force, State Failure Task Force Report, p. vi.
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US strategy: a broad security concept
For observers of United States strategic thinking, an expanded concept of se-
curity is a familiar concept. US policy formation has continuously struggled to 
reconcile normative goals, upon which the United States was founded, with the 
demands of political pragmatism. Henry Kissinger recognized the difficulties 
of weaving together these elements, writing that “the ultimate dilemma of the 
statesman is to strike a balance between values and interests and, occasionally, 
between peace and justice. The dichotomy postulated by many between moral-
ity and interest, between idealism and realism, is one of the standard clichés of 
the ongoing debate over international affairs. No such stark choice is, in fact, 
available.”94 In July 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged 
this dichotomy as being at the core of what she called American Realism. Ac-
cording to Rice, America’s moral ideas and principles should dictate the nation’s 
foreign policy as much as material interests: “American Realism deals with the 
world as it is, but strives to make the world better than it is. More free. More 
just. More peaceful. More prosperous. And ultimately safer. Not perfect. Just 
better.”95
Continuity can be seen in expressions of US interests in various strategic 
documents since 1991, and in many regards these core national interests have 
not changed substantially since at least 1945. First, and most basic, is the pro-
tection of the US and its citizens from physical threats of aggression from other 
states and non-state entities such as terrorist groups. Second, the US must ensure 
the country’s continued economic strength by promoting international trade and 
US access to global markets as well as strategic resources. Third, relations with 
allies and other friendly nations must be maintained. Finally, the US has an en-
during interest in spreading democracy and liberal ideals.96
Just as the set of core US interests has remained relatively constant; the set of 
perceived threats to those interests has followed a predictable pattern since the 
end of the Cold War. In a recent analysis of US strategy, Stephen Biddle com-
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OSlO FIlES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITy
COMPlEx RISkS TO hUMAN SECURITy
The impacts projected from climate change pose some serious traditional secu-
rity threats to some states. The possibility of interstate conflict is a real one – dis-
agreements over the distribution of scarce resources may lead to violence and 
internal conflicts. This study suggests that while climate change by itself may 
not directly cause outbreaks of violence, it certainly exacerbates existing po-
litical and societal tensions and increases the possibility for inter- or intra-state 
conflicts. Many of the studies mentioned above note that while environmental 
factors were not the main conflict trigger, they combined with or worsened other 
existing factors. The State Failure Task Force came to this conclusion, stating 
that while no direct relationship was found between instances of state failure 
and environmental factors, it was one of the possible contributing factors.93 
Nonetheless, the greatest risks posed by climate change are those impacting 
human security. Existing trends that pose substantial risks to human security are 
compounded by the effects of climate change, and will make it increasingly dif-
ficult to secure access to the most basic of needs. In general, the risks described 
in the preceding sections combine to directly impact all seven sub-sections of the 
original 1994 human security concept: food, health, economic, environmental, 
personal, community and political security. 
Through a discussion of United States security policy, the next section will 
demonstrate that those regions most vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
have also been identified as of increasing strategic relevance to US policymakers 
and strategists. While the US has not explicitly stated its intention to focus on 
human security in these regions, it is clear that a shift in strategic thinking has 
been underway and is consistent with previous US policies. Historically, the US 
has taken a broad approach to its national interests, incorporating idealistic ele-
ments for both altruistic and instrumental purposes. The basic components of 
US strategy will now be presented, elements that are fundamental in nature and 
have relevance regardless of the occupant of the White House.
93 State Failure Task Force, State Failure Task Force Report, p. vi.
PART II: INTEGRATING TRADITIONAl AND hUMAN SECURITy
US strategy: a broad security concept
For observers of United States strategic thinking, an expanded concept of se-
curity is a familiar concept. US policy formation has continuously struggled to 
reconcile normative goals, upon which the United States was founded, with the 
demands of political pragmatism. Henry Kissinger recognized the difficulties 
of weaving together these elements, writing that “the ultimate dilemma of the 
statesman is to strike a balance between values and interests and, occasionally, 
between peace and justice. The dichotomy postulated by many between moral-
ity and interest, between idealism and realism, is one of the standard clichés of 
the ongoing debate over international affairs. No such stark choice is, in fact, 
available.”94 In July 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged 
this dichotomy as being at the core of what she called American Realism. Ac-
cording to Rice, America’s moral ideas and principles should dictate the nation’s 
foreign policy as much as material interests: “American Realism deals with the 
world as it is, but strives to make the world better than it is. More free. More 
just. More peaceful. More prosperous. And ultimately safer. Not perfect. Just 
better.”95
Continuity can be seen in expressions of US interests in various strategic 
documents since 1991, and in many regards these core national interests have 
not changed substantially since at least 1945. First, and most basic, is the pro-
tection of the US and its citizens from physical threats of aggression from other 
states and non-state entities such as terrorist groups. Second, the US must ensure 
the country’s continued economic strength by promoting international trade and 
US access to global markets as well as strategic resources. Third, relations with 
allies and other friendly nations must be maintained. Finally, the US has an en-
during interest in spreading democracy and liberal ideals.96
Just as the set of core US interests has remained relatively constant; the set of 
perceived threats to those interests has followed a predictable pattern since the 
end of the Cold War. In a recent analysis of US strategy, Stephen Biddle com-
94 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2001), p. 286.
95 Condoleezza Rice, “The Power and Promise of American Realism”, address to the 
Economic Club of New York, 7 June 2007 [online 18 Oct 2007].
96 See George H.W, Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991 
(GlobalSecurity.org [online 17 Nov 2007]); William Jefferson Clinton, A National 
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, February 
1995 (GlobalSecurity.org [online 10 Nov 2007]); George W. Bush, The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, September 2002 
(GlobalSecurity.org [online 10 Nov 2007]). After the initial citation, all national 
security strategies will be referred to as NSS (year).
40 OSlO FIlES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITy 6/2007 FORECASTINg CRISIS
pared the threat perceptions contained in security documents from both the 
Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. The lists were remarkably similar 
– including potential peer competitors, rogue states, proliferation, terrorism, 
transnational crime, and regional crises or state failure – and Biddle found that 
“few truly new threats … have appeared in the last decade, and few have disap-
peared. Their relative severity has changed … but the list has not.”97 The ques-
tion became that of how best to address these threats and thereby secure US 
national interests.
IDEAlISM AND ThE NATIONAl INTEREST
While the administration of George W. Bush will be remembered for its heavily 
idealistic approach to national security, his was but an extreme example of the 
idealism mentioned above. The United States has long incorporated idealism 
into the formulation of its national interest. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet 
Union during the presidency of George H.W. Bush marked the end of the Cold 
War’s strategy of containment, though its premises and ideological foundations 
continue to reverberate in the present. The patterns of American foreign poli-
cy during the Cold War were marked by a combined emphasis on geopolitical 
and ideological considerations that shaped the perspectives of US policymakers. 
While their influence on policymakers varied considerably from one administra-
tion to the next, the “loss” of the Soviet Union as a framework for policy for-
mulation represented a huge challenge to the United States to fill the conceptual 
and organizational gap left by Cold War policy planning.
The first new strategic framework to be published in the post-Cold War 
period was “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy”, 
released in January 1993 by outgoing Defense Secretary Richard Cheney. The 
strategy stated clearly its intention of instituting a new strategic concept: “Our 
national strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to one on regional 
challenges and opportunities. We have moved from Containment to the new Re-
gional Defense Strategy.”98 The alliance of democratic nations developed during 
the Cold War, referred to repeatedly in the document as the “democratic zone 
of peace,” provided the US with strategic depth and would play a key role in US 
strategy.99 According to the strategy, the zone should be extended to include the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
Within this regional security framework, hostile non-democratic nations 
must be prevented from dominating regions deemed critical to US interests and 
97 Stephen Biddle, American Grand Strategy after 9/11: An Assessment (Carlisle, PA: US 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004) [online 10 May 2007], p. 4.
98 Dick Cheney, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy”, 
January 1993 (US Department of Defense [online 12 Feb 2007]).
99 The document defined this “democratic zone of peace” as “a community of democratic 
nations bound together by a web of political, economic, and security ties”.
the US must establish a clear military presence in some regions to accomplish 
this goal. The Regional Defense proposal expressed hope that collective action 
might solve future security issues, but recognized that a “collective effort will not 
always be timely and, in the absence of US leadership, may not gel. Where the 
stakes so merit, we must have forces ready to protect our critical interests.”100
President Clinton released “A National Security Strategy of Engagement 
and Enlargement” in February 1995, which divided US strategy into three in-
terconnected components: enhancing US military readiness, encouraging US 
economic prosperity and promoting democracy. This structure remained con-
stant in the Clinton administration’s successive security strategies even as the 
documents varied in their specific achievements, proposals, and detailed threat 
evaluations.101 Notably, the document emphasized economic issues and argued 
that external threats to national security were increasingly linked to those from 
within the US, that “domestic and foreign policies are increasingly blurred.”102 
Within this framework, economic issues and democracy promotion were elevat-
ed to a level on par with the more “traditional” areas of security policy encom-
passing mainly military issues. The expanded conceptualization of US national 
security provides the foundation for the active promotion of democracy and 
humanitarian efforts abroad.
The related theme of American exceptionalism also strongly influences this 
less tangible aspect of US policy, a concept exemplified by the belief that US 
power will only be used for the benefit of the international system. As the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states, the US military is a “force for good” 
in the world, echoing Colin Powell’s 1991 testimony before Congress where he 
argued that allies would not fear US military power because it was “power that 
could be trusted.”103 Robert Jervis has commented that 
... in the Bush doctrine, there are no universal norms or rules governing all states. 
On the contrary, order can be maintained only if the dominant power behaves 
quite differently from the others … American security, world stability, and the 
spread of liberalism require the United States to act in ways others cannot and 
must not. This is not a double standard, but is what world order requires.104 
100 Cheney, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s”.
101 William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
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This attitude necessarily affects diplomatic policy positions as well as US at-
titudes toward international laws and institutions. US officials, along with a 
sizeable portion of the American public, are convinced that the US has a special 
role to play in the world. Coupled with the idealistic element embedded in the 
national security concept, this exceptionalist view encourages a proactive for-
eign policy and inspires domestic audiences to support actions justified in the 
exceptionalist spirit.  
CURRENT US STRATEGy: GlObAl PRIMACy, COUNTERTERRORISM AND DEMOCRACy
The most fundamental aspect of current US strategy is the George W. Bush ad-
ministration’s clear intention to pursue a strategy of global primacy, defined as 
“acting aggressively to maintain America’s political and military predominance 
in the world, while pre-empting any conceivable challenges to a US-led interna-
tional order.”105 The 2002 and 2006 national security strategies (NSS) use nearly 
identical language in claiming that “our forces will be strong enough to dissuade 
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, 
or equaling, the power of the United States.”106 The 2004 National Military 
Strategy (NMS) stated, “the goal is full spectrum dominance (FSD) – the abil-
ity to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military 
operations.”107 The Bush White House represents a substantial course correction 
from previous administrations, though the undercurrents of primacy were evi-
dent prior to 2001. An analysis of Clinton’s security strategy by Barry Posen and 
Andrew Ross revealed conflicting pressures. The administration’s agenda was 
ambitious and activist, but could not be achieved without exercising US leader-
ship and power. The administration’s strategy was categorized as selective (but 
cooperative) primacy; Clinton’s activist agenda necessitated active US leadership 
to achieve its goals, but encountered resistance among its democratic allies.108
The 2006 QDR confirmed the continued relevance of this strategy of pri-
macy, proclaiming that the US will “seek to ensure that no foreign power can 
dictate the terms of regional or global security. It will attempt to dissuade any 
military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could 
enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States or other 
friendly countries.”109 Both the rise of China as a possible peer competitor and 
the threat of Iranian domination in the Persian Gulf region can be seen in this 
105 Colin Dueck, “Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand. Strategy, 2000–2004”, 
Review of International Studies, no. 30 (2004): 515.
106 NSS 2002, p. 30.
107 Richard B. Myers, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 
Defense Department, 2004 [online 18 Nov 2007].
108 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy” in 
Michael E. Brown et al., ed America’s Strategic Choices (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1998), p. 47.
109 QDR 2006, p. 30.
light. As noted in the 2004 NDS, the US military “must work to secure strategic 
access to key regions, lines of communication and the “global commons” of in-
ternational waters, airspace, space and cyberspace.”110 The US seeks not only to 
pursue its objectives in important strategic regions such as the Middle East, but 
also to retain the freedom to pursue US interests in every region. The 2006 QDR 
stated: “The United States will continue to adapt its global posture to promote 
constructive bilateral relations, mitigate anti-access threats and offset potential 
political coercion designed to limit US access to any region.”111 
In the 2002 NSS, Bush acknowledged the country’s “unparalleled military 
strength and great economic and political influence” and announced that the US 
will seek to “create a balance of power that favors human freedom … we will 
defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace 
by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace 
by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”112 The document 
is punctuated by the threat from international terrorism and the rogue states 
that support it; combating these threats is recognized as the primary security 
challenge facing the United States. The 2006 QDR also recognized “irregular 
warfare as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States.”113
The 2001 terrorist attacks erased any lingering perceptions about the safety 
of geographic distance and the relative isolation and protection provided by two 
oceans. The modernization and democratization of violence had combined with 
the interconnectedness of globalization to erase the natural buffers previously 
enjoyed by the United States. The Bush administration has therefore emphasized 
an offensive posture in the war on terror, choosing to fight the threat abroad 
in order to avoid attacks on the homeland. In this context, the US military has 
continued a transformational process begun under the Clinton administration 
that prioritizes mobility and rapid response in its overseas deployments to areas 
where terror organizations have become prevalent. In addition, the US has en-
gaged in active military operations against countries with links to terrorism as 
well as suspected camps and terror cells, most notably Iraq and Afghanistan.
As another means of addressing the threat of global terrorism, the Bush ad-
ministration has demonstrated an active rhetorical and diplomatic commitment 
to the recurring theme in US strategic thinking already mentioned: expanding 
the zone of democracy. In the US conceptualization of the global war on terror, 
the ideological component that has consistently accompanied US strategic think-
ing continues to play an active role in addressing the root causes of terrorism.114 
110 Ibid., p. 1.
111 QDR 2006, p. 30.
112 NSS 2002, introductory letter.
113 QDR 2006, p. 48.
114 The conclusions of the State Failure Task Force mentioned earlier, which found that 
transitional democracies posed the greatest risk for state failure, may be at odds with 
the notion of spreading democracy as part of a counterterrorism policy.
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While the prevalence of democracy-laden rhetoric emanating from Washington 
varies, it never completely disappears and remains a fundamental component of 
American identity.
Strategic focus: the Arc of Instability
The combination of counterterrorism and global primacy suggests an expansive 
strategic focus. In practice, the Pentagon has identified a broad area from which 
the most immediate threats will come. According to the 2001 Quadrennial De-
fense Review:
Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the 
potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten 
stability in regions critical to US interests. In particular, Asia is gradually emerg-
ing as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition. Along a broad arc 
of instability that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, the region 
contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers. The governments 
of some of these states are vulnerable to overthrow by radical or extremist inter-
nal political forces or movements. Many of these states field large militaries and 
possess the potential to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction.115
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld broadened the term in his 2002 annual 
report to Congress as stretching from “the Middle East to Northeast Asia.” The 
term resurfaced in the 2004 NMS, having expanded in geographical range to its 
current usage: “There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western 
Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There 
are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. 
Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them 
from surveillance and attack.”116 An August 2005 report observed that: 
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TERRORISM IN ThE ARC
While the term itself may eventually fall out of favor with strategists, the Arc 
of Instability captures the increasing emphasis placed on non-traditional threats 
from regions with growing strategic significance – US military planners clearly 
anticipate the most pressing threats to US national security to emanate from 
these regions. Failing states or rogue states in these regions are more likely to 
harbor fundamentalist or extremist groups, and such groups are more likely to 
have access to weaponry that could inflict catastrophic damage to the US or 
its allies. As the NIC report shows, these types of states are located in areas in 
which radical Islamic groups have been most active – in the heart of the Arc of 
Instability.118
US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan linked to the global war on terror are well 
known, while less focus is placed on counterterrorism activities conducted by 
the US military in places such as the Philippines and on the African continent. 
Small numbers of American forces, acting primarily in an advisory role and sup-
ported by US intelligence efforts, since 2002 have assisted the Philippine military 
118 NIC, Mapping the Global Future, p. 82.
Fig. 2: Key areas of radical Islamic activities since 1992 (ill.: Central Intelligence Agency).
in weakening the Islamic guerrilla groups in that country.119 In 2002 the United 
States established a military presence in the Horn of Africa, the Combined Joint 
Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), for the purpose of “detecting, dis-
rupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the 
region – denying safe havens, external support, and material assistance for ter-
rorist activity.”120 The Task Force is headquartered at Camp Lemonier in Dji-
bouti. According to the US military, its 1800 military personnel conduct “unified 
action in the combined joint operations area of the Horn of Africa to prevent 
conflict, promote regional stability, and protect Coalition interests in order to 
prevail against extremism.”121 The Pentagon has also adjusted its operational 
capabilities for counterterrorism in the Arc. In terms of force structures, the De-
fense Department has prioritized a modular approach that features self-sufficient 
military units capable of “long-duration irregular operations.” The US Army is 
reorganizing into brigade-based units, with brigade combat teams (BCT) and 
support brigades; these brigades will assume many of the roles now performed 
by Special Operations Forces (SOF) units, which will then be free to undertake 
more complex and specialized tasks.122  
The US has formed new bilateral relationships with countries inside and 
adjacent to the Arc since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 2001. In 
addition, the US has since 2002 incorporated so-called Article 98 agreements 
with 100 countries (mostly in the Arc) into Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) 
whereby they pledge not to surrender American citizens to the International 
Criminal Court.123 The 2006 QDR also argues for increased legal maneuvering 
room for relationships with countries in the Arc that may not meet current US 
legal standards in terms of human rights and democratic institutions. The 2006 
QDR recommends that “Congress provide considerably greater flexibility in the 
US Government’s ability to partner directly with nations in fighting terrorists,” 
which may include “training, equipping and advising their security force” or 
“logistics support, equipment, training and transport to allow them to partici-
pate as members of coalitions with the United States or its allies.”124 The legisla-
tion pertaining to foreign assistance, military aid and IMET contains provisions 
restricting their use in countries with poor human rights records or other nor-
mative concerns. US actions will require partners in regions where democratic 
institutions and respect for human rights are less prevalent. This exemplifies just 
119 Paul Wiseman, “In Philippines, US making progress in war on terror”, USA Today, 13 
February 2007 [online 14 November 2007].
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one of many difficult choices facing US policymakers in conducting the war on 
terror or providing security to the Arc: to prioritize security interests or human 
rights concerns.125
ENERGy IN ThE ARC 
In addition to the military focus on counterterrorism, one other aspect of the 
Arc of Instability is of particular strategic interest. A substantial portion of the 
world’s energy resource is found there: approximately 80 percent of global oil 
reserves and 60 percent of global natural gas reserves. If one excludes North 
America and Russia from the global totals, the share of remaining available re-
sources located in the Arc jumps to over 90 percent of both oil and natural gas 
reserves.126 Also located in the Arc are the major choke points for transport of 
these raw materials, including pipelines across Central Asia and Africa as well 
as maritime routes in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and Suez Canal, the Panama 
Canal in Central America, and the Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia. 
Economic and strategic interests converge with regard to China in the Arc 
as well. Securing access to energy resources is vital to the US economy as well as 
its military. Petroleum-based fuels power not only US economic growth but also 
many of the ships, tanks, aircraft, and other military vehicles needed to project 
US power. Increased market prices and new technologies allow access to reserves 
that were previously economically unfeasible and new reserves are constantly 
being developed, though at increased costs. Ultimately, however, these resources 
are fundamentally finite and energy demands will only increase over the next 25 
years. According to the DCDC Global Strategic Trends report, Chinese imports 
in 2030 will represent a 100 percent increase over 2004 levels to 52 million oil-
equivalent barrels per day, India’s needs will increase 164 percent to 29 million 
barrels per day, and North America will see a 25 percent increase to 69 million 
barrels per day.127 
As a result, “Competition for energy supplies will dominate the economic 
landscape during the next 30 years … the prospect, apparent or real, of the peak 
production of oil during the timeframe out to 2035 and progressive diminu-
tion of output thereafter will intensify competition for remaining resources.”128 
China has begun a global campaign to secure access to these resources to fuel its 
125 For more on this, see Michael Mayer, “Security or Human Rights: US Foreign Policy 
Dilemma in Uzbekistan”, Forsvarsstudier, no. 2 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for 
Defence Studies, 2006).
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countries classified as in the Arc include: Columbia, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and all 
countries in Africa and the Middle East. These BP calculations exclude the tar-sands of 
Canada, which represent a growing source of petroleum for the United States, but only 
after highly energy-intensive processing that generates substantial greenhouse gases.
127 DCDC, Global Strategic Trends, p. 32.
128 Ibid., p. 31.
growing economy, entering into bilateral agreements with countries in regions 
such as South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. In the first 
half of 2006, Africa constituted 32 percent of China’s oil imports and Beijing is 
actively seeking new agreements.129 
According to the 2006 NSS, “the key to ensuring our energy security is 
diversity in the regions from which energy resources come and in the types of 
energy resources on which we rely.”130 Unhindered energy exports to the US, 
rather than direct control over the resources themselves, seem to be the strategic 
goal. Economic strength in no small part translates to strategic influence and 
military power, and the raw materials needed to fuel both military machinery 
and economic growth represent strategic goods. In regions lacking liberal insti-
tutions – and where energy resources may be nationalized and under the control 
of oligarchies – political and military influence may be the tools necessary to 
secure export agreements. A study by the Council on Foreign Relations found 
that US dependence on foreign oil affects US policy in a variety of ways: large oil 
revenues give oil exporters flexibility to adopt policies that may conflict with US 
interests, oil dependency leads to political alliances that can prevent US partner-
ships and reduce US influence, seeming oil scarcity can lead to commercial deals 
with political implications, and possible disruptions in supplies can have serious 
economic consequences.131 Chinese economic activities in Africa also represent a 
challenge to the US strategy of global primacy, in instances when close relations 
between African governments and Chinese authorities may hinder strategic ac-
cess to the region.132
MIlITARy bASING IN ThE ARC
The US military’s overseas presence, a holdover from its Cold War posture, plays 
a crucial role in US strategy. Not only do the hundreds of military installations 
located in nearly every region of the world allow the US to respond quickly 
to threats, their presence also assists in shaping the strategic environment in 
those regions deemed especially vital to US interests. As a 2005 review of the 
Pentagon’s basing strategy noted, “We cannot hope for much influence without 
presence – the degree of influence often correlates to the level of permanent pres-
ence that we maintain forward.”133 The 2002 NSS recognized that “to contend 
129 Energy Information Administration, China Country Analysis, last updated August 
2006 [online 9 Nov 2007].
130 NSS 2006, p. 28.
131 Council on Foreign Relations, National Consequences of US Oil Dependency 
(Washington, DC:CFR, 2006 [online 21 Nov 2007]), p. 26–29.
132 While not the subject of this study, it may be noted that the projected impacts of 
climate change in China may create internal disruptions that may lessen the intensity 
of Chinese foreign policy and the military threat it poses. At the same time, instability 
in that country presents a substantial risk in and of itself.
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OSlO FIlES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITy 46/2007 FORECASTINg CRISIS
one of many difficult choices facing US policymakers in conducting the war on 
terror or providing security to the Arc: to prioritize security interests or human 
rights concerns.125
ENERGy IN ThE ARC 
In addition to the military focus on counterterrorism, one other aspect of the 
Arc of Instability is of particular strategic interest. A substantial portion of the 
world’s energy resource is found there: approximately 80 percent of global oil 
reserves and 60 percent of global natural gas reserves. If one excludes North 
America and Russia from the global totals, the share of remaining available re-
sources located in the Arc jumps to over 90 percent of both oil and natural gas 
reserves.126 Also located in the Arc are the major choke points for transport of 
these raw materials, including pipelines across Central Asia and Africa as well 
as maritime routes in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and Suez Canal, the Panama 
Canal in Central America, and the Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia. 
Economic and strategic interests converge with regard to China in the Arc 
as well. Securing access to energy resources is vital to the US economy as well as 
its military. Petroleum-based fuels power not only US economic growth but also 
many of the ships, tanks, aircraft, and other military vehicles needed to project 
US power. Increased market prices and new technologies allow access to reserves 
that were previously economically unfeasible and new reserves are constantly 
being developed, though at increased costs. Ultimately, however, these resources 
are fundamentally finite and energy demands will only increase over the next 25 
years. According to the DCDC Global Strategic Trends report, Chinese imports 
in 2030 will represent a 100 percent increase over 2004 levels to 52 million oil-
equivalent barrels per day, India’s needs will increase 164 percent to 29 million 
barrels per day, and North America will see a 25 percent increase to 69 million 
barrels per day.127 
As a result, “Competition for energy supplies will dominate the economic 
landscape during the next 30 years … the prospect, apparent or real, of the peak 
production of oil during the timeframe out to 2035 and progressive diminu-
tion of output thereafter will intensify competition for remaining resources.”128 
China has begun a global campaign to secure access to these resources to fuel its 
125 For more on this, see Michael Mayer, “Security or Human Rights: US Foreign Policy 
Dilemma in Uzbekistan”, Forsvarsstudier, no. 2 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for 
Defence Studies, 2006).
126 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006 [online 19 Nov 2007], Relevant 
countries classified as in the Arc include: Columbia, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and all 
countries in Africa and the Middle East. These BP calculations exclude the tar-sands of 
Canada, which represent a growing source of petroleum for the United States, but only 
after highly energy-intensive processing that generates substantial greenhouse gases.
127 DCDC, Global Strategic Trends, p. 32.
128 Ibid., p. 31.
growing economy, entering into bilateral agreements with countries in regions 
such as South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. In the first 
half of 2006, Africa constituted 32 percent of China’s oil imports and Beijing is 
actively seeking new agreements.129 
According to the 2006 NSS, “the key to ensuring our energy security is 
diversity in the regions from which energy resources come and in the types of 
energy resources on which we rely.”130 Unhindered energy exports to the US, 
rather than direct control over the resources themselves, seem to be the strategic 
goal. Economic strength in no small part translates to strategic influence and 
military power, and the raw materials needed to fuel both military machinery 
and economic growth represent strategic goods. In regions lacking liberal insti-
tutions – and where energy resources may be nationalized and under the control 
of oligarchies – political and military influence may be the tools necessary to 
secure export agreements. A study by the Council on Foreign Relations found 
that US dependence on foreign oil affects US policy in a variety of ways: large oil 
revenues give oil exporters flexibility to adopt policies that may conflict with US 
interests, oil dependency leads to political alliances that can prevent US partner-
ships and reduce US influence, seeming oil scarcity can lead to commercial deals 
with political implications, and possible disruptions in supplies can have serious 
economic consequences.131 Chinese economic activities in Africa also represent a 
challenge to the US strategy of global primacy, in instances when close relations 
between African governments and Chinese authorities may hinder strategic ac-
cess to the region.132
MIlITARy bASING IN ThE ARC
The US military’s overseas presence, a holdover from its Cold War posture, plays 
a crucial role in US strategy. Not only do the hundreds of military installations 
located in nearly every region of the world allow the US to respond quickly 
to threats, their presence also assists in shaping the strategic environment in 
those regions deemed especially vital to US interests. As a 2005 review of the 
Pentagon’s basing strategy noted, “We cannot hope for much influence without 
presence – the degree of influence often correlates to the level of permanent pres-
ence that we maintain forward.”133 The 2002 NSS recognized that “to contend 
129 Energy Information Administration, China Country Analysis, last updated August 
2006 [online 9 Nov 2007].
130 NSS 2006, p. 28.
131 Council on Foreign Relations, National Consequences of US Oil Dependency 
(Washington, DC:CFR, 2006 [online 21 Nov 2007]), p. 26–29.
132 While not the subject of this study, it may be noted that the projected impacts of 
climate change in China may create internal disruptions that may lessen the intensity 
of Chinese foreign policy and the military threat it poses. At the same time, instability 
in that country presents a substantial risk in and of itself.
133 Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structures of the United States, 
Final report ..., p. 9.
50 OSlO FIlES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITy 6/2007 FORECASTINg CRISIS
with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United 
States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and 
Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance 
deployment of U.S. forces.”134
These global strategic adjustments entail a shift in worldwide US military 
posture. “We are living in a revolution, and hardly anyone has noticed,” wrote 
Charles Krauthammer in July 2003 about the repositioning of US bases around 
the globe.135 As Douglas Feith, then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, stated 
in 2003: “everything is going to move everywhere … There is not going to be a 
place in the world where it’s going to be the same as it used to be.”136 A strategic 
adjustment from the Cold War posture to one focused on the Arc of Instability 
is underway, though at the creeping bureaucratic pace of the Defense Depart-
ment. 
According to Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Policy, the new global defense posture shifts away from “legacy Cold War struc-
tures” in Europe, reforms US posture in the Pacific “to assure allies … dissuade 
potential competitors, deter aggressors, and defeat adversaries if called upon to 
do so,” and develops “the operational flexibility and diversity in options needed 
to contend with uncertainty in the “arc of instability”.”137 On a practical level, 
the global redeployment of US forces entails closing almost 200 facilities in Eu-
rope and shifting to smaller installations in Eastern European countries such as 
Bulgaria and Romania, which “offer ports and airfields on the Black Sea, closer 
to potential instability in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East.”138 
As overseas basing facilities require substantial investments both economically 
and politically, such adjustments are not taken lightly and can be said to reflect 
the long-term strategic thinking of the United States.
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Climate change in the Arc: fusing state and human security
The preceding analysis of US strategic interests clearly relies on a traditional 
concept of security. It focuses on threats to US national security and access to 
the raw materials upon which its economic and military security depend. What 
has become increasingly clear in the post-Cold War world, however, is that the 
sources of these traditional security threats are not primarily military in nature. 
American foreign policy has often utilized military force as a political tool to 
further its strategic aims, both in classic interstate conflicts (the 1991 Gulf War), 
unconventional (the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict in December 2006, counterinsur-
gency assistance to the Philippines and Colombia), or conflicts that evolved from 
interstate to unconventional (Afghanistan, Iraq). Regardless of the stated aims 
at the outset of each conflict, the set of solutions leading to a successful outcome 
for the United States in many of these cases rests not with decisive military vic-
tory, but with improved human security.
In Colombia and Afghanistan, US objectives are served by finding alter-
nate sources of income for farmers growing narcotics that contribute to drug 
abuse, increased criminal activity, and funding for armed sub-state groups in 
both countries. In Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that 
rebuild the country’s infrastructure are a crucial pillar in NATO’s strategy for a 
successful outcome, along with “maintaining security” in the country. In Iraq, 
the 2007 “surge” strategy of the Bush administration had as its main goal to 
increase security among the residents of Baghdad in order to allow Iraqi politi-
cians the “breathing space” necessary to reach political compromises. In each 
of these examples, improving human security is the decisive part of the overall 
strategy for success, well beyond the “hearts and minds” approach. By the same 
token, US military actions in each of these cases have also threatened human 
security either through initiating armed conflict or supporting it indirectly. In 
addition, structural damages and civilian casualties as a result of “collateral 
damage” in military operations directly affect human security. Whether the cho-
sen policy enhanced or threatened it, human security was and remains the cru-
cial component for addressing many of the traditional security threats facing the 
United States.
ClIMATE ChANGE AND US INTERESTS
In general, the effects of climate change pose the greatest risk to human security. 
This in turn threatens traditional US security interests such as terrorism and 
energy supplies. In terms of the global war on terror, weak states are attractive 
locations for terrorist bases and training centers. These ungoverned areas are 
perfect for conducting shadowy arms deals and transfers of dangerous mate-
rials. This study has demonstrated the risks to weak states posed by climate 
change. Environmental pressures that threaten the survivability of states within 
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tory, but with improved human security.
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In general, the effects of climate change pose the greatest risk to human security. 
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locations for terrorist bases and training centers. These ungoverned areas are 
perfect for conducting shadowy arms deals and transfers of dangerous mate-
rials. This study has demonstrated the risks to weak states posed by climate 
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the Arc should be of great concern to the United States. Indeed, retired CENT-
COM Commander-in-Chief Anthony Zinni made this very argument:
You may also have a population that is traumatized by an event or a change 
in conditions triggered by climate change. If the government there is not able 
to cope with the effects, and if other institutions are unable to cope, then you 
can be faced with a collapsing state. And these end up as breeding grounds for 
instability, for insurgencies, for warlords. You start to see real extremism. These 
places act like Petri dishes for extremism and for terrorist networks.139
The increased likelihood of violence and instability as a result of climate change 
impacts US counterterrorism efforts in a fundamental way, as another retired 
military leader argued in the same report. The former commander of NATO 
forces in Bosnia, Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, noted that “in the long term, we 
want to address the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit … But 
climate change prolongs those conditions. It makes them worse.”140 
The United States will remain dependent on fossil fuels for the foreseeable 
future, and continued domestic economic growth is dependent on access to oil 
and natural gas. As the vast majority of these reserves are located in countries 
within the Arc, the United States retains a strategic interest in the uninterrupted 
flow of energy exports to the international market. Nigeria supplies 10–12 per-
cent of US oil imports and its importance is growing. By 2020, oil from Nigeria 
and its neighbors in the Gulf of Guinea will account for 20–25 percent of all US 
imports.141 Social and political unrest can threaten exports through open con-
flict, sabotage of oil industry infrastructure or abductions of oil workers, or in-
ternal clashes over physical and administrative control over national resources. 
In addition, uncontrolled crime and piracy can also threaten the security of en-
ergy exports. In October 2007 the United States Navy dispatched a vessel to the 
Gulf of Guinea under the Africa Partnership Station Initiative, aimed at working 
“cooperatively with US and international partners in promoting maritime secu-
rity in Western Africa.”142
Western Africa has a significant portion of another of the world’s strate-
gic resources: uranium. Nearly 20 percent of the known recoverable uranium 
resources are located there, and current top producers include Niger, Namibia 
and South Africa. Production has greatly expanded in recent years, explained by 
increased demand for nuclear power as a result of high oil and gas prices, and 
139 CNA Corp, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, p. 31.
140 Ibid., p. 17.
141 Alex Perry, “Africa’s Oil Dreams”, Time, 11 June 2007 [online 15 June 2007].
142 US State Department, “Ship’s Mission to Boost US-Africa Maritime Security 
Partnership”, 16 October 2007 [online 9 November 2007].
the lack of regulations and weak governments in the region.143 Obviously this 
development is of great concern to the United States and its allies due to the pos-
sibility of proliferation to terrorist organizations or rogue states. The political 
instability associated with climate change impacts could easily affect the security 
of this material.
Terrorism, access to energy, and the US strategy of primacy merge com-
pletely in Central Asia. Emerging as newly independent states after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan slowly caught the strategic interest of the United States. Washing-
ton initially focused its efforts on non-proliferation, promotion of democracy, 
and diversification of the region’s energy export routes. After the 1998 terrorist 
attacks on the US embassies in Africa and even more so after the 2001 attacks, 
Central Asia became central to the war on terror with its potential as a hotbed 
of Islamic radicalism simmering under the yoke of authoritarian regimes. In 
addition, a geopolitical contest over energy exports and political influence be-
tween the US, Russia and China has resulted in a highly dynamic political land-
scape in the region, made even more complex by developments in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. Overlying these strategic trends, political tensions exist over the 
region’s water distribution – upstream nations will use their mountain-fed water 
reserves to generate power, while downstream nations depend on regular flows 
for agricultural production.144
As in other regions, climate change in Central Asia promises to shrink 
glacial mass, reduce snowfalls, and negatively affect the availability of water. 
With reduced growing seasons and increased desertification, exemplified by the 
shrinking of the Aral Sea and its subsequent environmental and social conse-
quences, downstream countries will be increasingly dependent on greater access 
to water. Increasing tensions and disagreements over water rights may impact 
another crucial trans-border effort in the region, namely pipelines for energy 
export. For example, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have had previous disagree-
ments over water supplies, once resulting in Uzbekistan seizing the Karshinskiy 
Canal in 2003 to ensure water access.145 A proposed Turkmen pipeline to China 
crossing Uzbek territory might fall victim to rising diplomatic tensions over wa-
ter rights. 
In addition, societal stresses caused by decreased food production and eco-
nomic hardship will serve to exacerbate the existing perception among citizens 
in this region that their governments are more interested in retaining power than 
in an equitable distribution of resources. Radical Islam currently serves as an 
143 Igor Khripunov, “Exploiting Africa”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, September (2007): 
51–3.
144 See Mayer, Security or Human Rights.
145 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests” CRS 
Report for Congress, updated January 2005 [online 5 Feb 2007], p. 16.
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outlet for such frustrations, and will likely benefit from increased hardships and 
societal pressures. Increasing urbanization and youth bulges also exacerbate the 
threat by providing fertile recruiting grounds. In a region with sizable energy 
reserves and populations vulnerable to fundamentalism, the US may find that 
climate change presents real threats to its interests.
US IDEAlISM AND hUMANITARIAN MISSIONS
Apart from the threats to purely strategic interests that the negative effects of 
climate change may cause, one must also consider the US desire to provide hu-
manitarian assistance out of moral obligations, idealistic motivations or a sense 
of American exceptionalism. When George H. W. Bush announced Operation 
Restore Hope, which sent military forces to Somalia in 1992 as lawlessness in 
the country hindered UN humanitarian relief efforts, he said: 
The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We’re 
able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. 
America must act. In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand 
the United States alone cannot right the world’s wrongs. But we also know that 
some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that 
American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the 
community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a 
large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently 
and thus save thousands of innocents from death.146
The United States has often pursued projects that satisfied not only the ideal-
istic sentiment among Americans, but also served a strategic purpose. When 
President John F. Kennedy founded the Peace Corps in 1961, its intention was 
not only to channel American idealism into improving the living standards in 
developing countries, but also to counter communist influence. As one scholar 
has argued, 
the Peace Corps represented, in part, an attempt to reorient US foreign policy 
in the Third World toward economic development … US political leaders at the 
time recognized that underdeveloped, newly independent, and highly nation-
alistic nations were more susceptible to communist influence than were more 
prosperous nations.”147 
146 “Mission to Somalia: Transcript of President’s address on Somalia”, New York Times, 
5 December 1992 [online 19 Nov 2007].
147 Michael R. Hall, “Impact of the US Peace Corps at Home and Abroad”, Journal of 
Third World Studies, Spring 2007 (BNET Research Center [online 1 Nov 2007]).
In much the same way, responding to the risks posed by climate change and pro-
moting human security in the Arc appeals to the idealistic nature of US policy 
while at the same time complementing pragmatic security objectives. The pro-
jected impacts of climate change only increase the likelihood and complexity of 
possible US involvement in preventing or responding to humanitarian crises in 
the Arc. The increased risk of conflicts resulting from impacts of climate change 
will also make US participation in stabilization or peacekeeping missions more 
likely.
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Emerging US tools for managing human security risks
The United States will remain involved in the Arc for both strategic and hu-
manitarian reasons, and will therefore be affected by the climate change impacts 
previously discussed. Not only will US strategic interests be threatened, but the 
effects of climate change will increase the challenges and hazards of operations 
that will likely occur in the most affected regions. In this way, the United States 
cannot hope to avoid the negative effects of climate change, even if the country 
itself remains able to cope with the environmental challenges directly facing the 
US homeland. Its strategic focus lies in the Arc, and this is where future military 
and humanitarian operations will occur. The primary objective of the US will 
most likely not be military conquest, especially after developments in Iraq have 
led both the American public and the Pentagon to view negatively the idea of 
unilateral nation-building. Nor does the US have the financial wherewithal to 
fund another nation-building project even if it might desire to initiate a regime 
shift in the Arc.
However, the military will be more active in this region than anywhere else 
in the world, as it has been since the Cold War. While the international political 
system was framed by the political and ideological stand-off between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the actual use of military force took place in the 
Arc: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua. After the Cold War ended, this pattern continued. Thomas Barnett 
surveyed a database of 140 named US military operations from 1990 to 2003 
and found that most of the Pentagon’s activity lay in an area stretching from 
northern South America, across Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and most 
of Southeast Asia: in other words, the Arc of Instability.148 This demonstrates a 
durable pattern of strategic interest that preceded the Bush administration and 
will likely continue in the foreseeable future.
Barnett argued in his book that the US, as the hegemonic leader of a func-
tioning core of countries integrated through political and economic liberaliza-
tion, should seek to provide security and order in those regions that are dis-
connected from the liberalizing effects of globalization, an area he called the 
non-integrated gap, and strive to integrate these countries into the core. In his 
view, the overarching strategy of the United States should be to “shrink the gap” 
by exporting security to those regions by way of a combat-oriented component 
(the Leviathan) and a civil-affairs-oriented component (the System Administra-
tor). Coincidence or not, Barnett’s concept is consistent with several aspects of 
US strategic planning. 
148 Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: Berkley Books, 2004), pp. 
144–150.
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In the following section, some key aspects of US military planning will be dis-
cussed – planning that reflects shifting attitudes toward the type of operations 
likely to be required in the Arc as climate change impacts are increasingly felt. 
These new capacities, both military and civilian, focus directly on alleviating the 
risks to and improving human security. It should be noted that this study does 
not argue that the military directly acknowledges the threat of climate change to 
US national security, merely that the capabilities being developed are consistent 
with those likely to be needed in the Arc, both to prevent existing instability and 
to prevent crises linked to the projected impacts of climate change.
REDESIGNED ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO ThE ARC
Despite the Bush administration’s preoccupation with the war in Iraq, the US 
has also invested substantial funding to improve human security in Africa. The 
US nearly tripled the amount of official development assistance to sub-Saharan 
Africa, from $1.1 billion in 2000 to $3.2 billion in 2004. Further, the US has 
provided $150 million to the African Union’s peacekeeping efforts in Darfur, 
in addition to over $638 million in humanitarian assistance to Darfur. The US 
has plans to provide training for 40,000 African peacekeepers through various 
programs.149 Programs such as the Millennium Challenge Account are designed 
to encourage good governance and economic policies in developing countries. 
This initiative, being administered by the government-run Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, had by the end of 2006 “contracts” with 11 countries worth near-
ly $3 billion, and awarded $286 million worth of aid to 11 other “threshold” 
countries not yet qualified to enter into full partnerships.150 While the effects of 
these efforts may be debated or criticized, these assistance programs are clearly 
directed at improving human security, and will become increasingly valuable to 
minimize the effects of climate change.
STATE DEPARTMENT RECONSTRUCTION CAPAbIlITy
In 2004 the US State Department, at the direction of the National Security 
Council and with congressional support, created the Office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). According to the State Depart-
ment, the mission of the S/CRS is to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US 
Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, 
and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil 
149 US State Department, “Key US Government Assistance Programs for Africa”, fact 
sheet, 15 June 2005 [online 10 Nov 2007].
150 Millennium Challenge Corporation, Annual Report 2006, p. 23 [online 10 Nov 2007].
strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a mar-
ket economy.”151
One related aspect that bears mentioning is a proposal to establish a 
civilian-based reserve corps.152 This idea was tucked away in the 2006 QDR, 
when the authors charged that the US military had become the “default re-
sponder during many contingencies,” and recommended increased support for 
the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability and that 
department’s “proposal to establish a deployable Civilian Reserve Corps and a 
Conflict Response Fund.”153 In the 2007 State of the Union address, President 
Bush called for “a volunteer civilian reserve corps. Such a corps would function 
much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the armed forces by 
allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when 
America needs them.”154 
DOCTRINAl ShIFTS IN ThE ARMED FORCES
The branch of the US military most heavily relied upon in Iraq, and generally 
in the war on terror, is the US Army. The Army has historically focused on 
fighting conventional conflicts against other states, remaining skeptical about 
other types of operations. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has under-
gone a doctrinal shift that places an increasing importance on stabilization and 
reconstruction operations. As Olof Kronvall writes, “the big war paradigm no 
longer pervades US Army doctrine as completely as it once did, but it is still 
predominant,” though “attention is increasingly directed to post-conflict stabil-
ity and support operations.”155 The Defense Department defines stabilization 
missions as establishing physical security and providing for basic human needs, 
and reconstruction as the creation of sustainable economic, social, and political 
conditions. 
One visible sign that the US military recognizes the inevitability of future 
operations in developing countries is the concept of the three-block war. In a 
151 US State Department, “Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
(S/CRS)”, fact sheet, [online 10 Nov 2007].
152 Once again, parallels to Barnett’s Pentagon’s New Map can be seen. Barnett proposed 
a “Leviathan” force responsible for power projection, regime change and winning the 
wars, while a “System Administrator” force would be civilian-oriented, constabulary 
in focus and responsible for winning the peace, see Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, 
p. 315–327.
153 QDR 2006, p. 86.
154 George W. Bush, State of the Union address, 23 January 2007 (White House [online 
16 Nov 2007]).
155 Olof Kronvall, “The Big War Paradigm Challenged?, in Säkerhetspolitik och historia: 
Stormaktspolitiken och Norden under sjuttio år. Vänbok till Krister Wahlbäck, eds 
Mats Bergquist & Alf W. Johansson [Security Policy and History: Great Power Politics 
and the Nordic Countries during Seventy Years. A Festschrift for Krister Wahlbäck] 
(Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg bokförlag, 2007), p. 191.
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1999 article, then-commandant of the US Marine Corps General Charles C. 
Krulak described the future operational environment of the Marines:
The rapid diffusion of technology, the growth of a multitude of transnational 
factors, and the consequences of increasing globalization and economic inter-
dependence, have coalesced to create national security challenges remarkable 
for their complexity. By 2020, eighty-five percent of the world’s inhabitants will 
be crowded into coastal cities – cities generally lacking the infrastructure re-
quired to support their burgeoning populations. Under these conditions, long 
simmering ethnic, nationalist, and economic tensions will explode and create 
the potential for crises requiring US intervention. Compounding the challenges 
posed by this growing global instability will be the emergence of an increas-
ingly complex and lethal battlefield. The widespread availability of sophisticated 
weapons and equipment will “level the playing field” and negate our traditional 
technological superiority. The lines separating the levels of war, and distinguish-
ing combatants from “non-combatants” will blur, and adversaries, confounded 
by our “conventional” superiority, will resort to asymmetrical means to redress 
the imbalance.156
Contained in Krulak’s description are a number of the underlying trends, re-
ferred to earlier in this study, that will contribute to complex conflicts where 
the military “may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in 
the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks,” 
including humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping or traditional warfighting.157 
Krulak argues that this type of conflict places a much greater responsibility upon 
the “small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest levels … success or 
failure will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability to make the 
right decision at the right time at the point of contact,” what Krulak calls the 
“strategic corporal.”158 The three-block war concept exemplifies the type of situ-
ations the US military is likely to encounter in the Arc, increasingly so with the 
projected impacts of climate change.
Since 2004, several Pentagon directives “decreed that stability and recon-
struction operations were henceforth to be assigned the same importance and 
priority as Major Combat Operations in the activities of the Armed Forces.”159 
This trend has been confirmed in other strategic documents and by Pentagon 
officials, including Defense Secretary Robert Gates. In a 2007 speech to the 
Association of the United States Army, Gates said that in addition to retain-
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ing their conventional warfighting capabilities, “Army soldiers can expect to be 
tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting 
good governance. All these so-called “non-traditional” capabilities have moved 
into the mainstream of military thinking, planning and strategy – where they 
must stay.”160 Additional signs confirming this doctrinal shift include the 2006 
publication of both a new US Army counterinsurgency doctrine, Field Manual 
3-24, and an updated urban operations manual; the US Air Force followed suit 
in 2007 with an updated manual detailing the use of air power in counterinsur-
gency operations.161 The US Army urban operations manual states that “Army 
forces will likely conduct operations in, around and over urban areas – not as 
a matter of fate, but as a deliberate choice linked to national security objectives 
and strategy.”162
The combination of counterterrorism operations and stabilization capa-
bilities with combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan culminated in the ad-
mission by General John Abizaid to Congress in November 2006 that the US 
Army was unable to increase its troop levels in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group 
report, released a month later, also concluded that US forces were stretched 
thin.163 President Bush in the 2007 State of the Union address announced his 
intention to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 troops 
over a five-year period, a plan endorsed by most of the leading 2008 presidential 
candidates.164 There is tension among military planners concerning this point, 
illustrated by the 2006 QDR, where according to some experts the difficult 
budgetary choices between conventional warfighting and counterterrorism and 
stability operations capabilities have not yet been made.165 This debate perhaps 
reflects the changing perceptions within the US military establishment from a 
traditional security approach to one of human security. One recent addition to 
the Pentagon’s bureaucracy, the new Africa Command, appears to be an attempt 
to reconcile these two security approaches.
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AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM)
The newest regional military command, Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been 
designed to integrate several types of missions under one agency. Its main objec-
tives are to “provide support to Africans as they continue to build democratic 
institutions and establish good governance. It will focus on tasks such as peace-
keeping, security, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster re-
lief.”166 The command structure is experimental and integrates State Department 
officials and members of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
together with a focus on energy issues and intelligence-gathering. AFRICOM’s 
activities will focus largely on humanitarian relief, disaster response and small 
unit military training and exercises, building schools, wells and bridges along 
with officer training.167 AFRICOM’s “primary mission will be “shaping” activi-
ties, designed to ameliorate troubling trends in the region by helping to eliminate 
the roots of extremism, terrorism and violent conflict before they reach a crisis, 
rather than the traditional operations involving the use of force.”168
The new command is not without its critics. While some inside the US 
question the wisdom or necessity of linking humanitarian efforts with military 
ones, African leaders are concerned about the flow of arms “overwhelming” 
the flow of aid. South Africa’s Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota has encour-
aged other African nations to reject AFRICOM’s presence.169 The US has seem-
ingly struggled to balance its expanded war on terror with humanitarian and 
sustainable development needs in Africa. In Somalia, for example, the US ac-
cused the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union (ICU) of links to al Qaeda, and 
initially supported local warlords against the government before finally back-
ing an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. US special operations forces in 
Somalia hunted down suspected terrorists while AC-130 gunships targeted them 
in multiple airstrikes.170 Fighting has continued around Somalia’s capital Moga-
dishu throughout 2007, noted Newsweek, “killing hundreds of innocent civil-
ians and forcing some 400,000 from their homes, without decisively toppling 
the Islamists.”171
AFRICOM’s attempts to integrate civilian and military foreign policy com-
ponents can also be problematic. A 2006 report by the Republican staff of the 
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed growing friction within US embas-
sies over the expanding role of the military, in some cases overshadowing State 
Department diplomats in conducting US foreign policy. The growing numbers 
of military personnel stationed in embassies since 2001 has been seen as another 
sign of the militarization of foreign policy, a trend considered counterproductive 
by many.172 In a similar vein, a 2007 Washington Post opinion piece by Hans 
Binnendijk argued that an under-funded diplomatic corps has been progressively 
weakened while the Pentagon has seen substantial budgetary increases.173 
The Defense Department has substantially increased its role in develop-
ment assistance programs, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, and accounted for 
more than 20 percent of all US development assistance funding in 2005.174 This 
increased role in development projects raises questions about whether the mili-
tary has undertaken roles best suited for development professionals in the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) or the State Department. In ad-
dition, the Pentagon may emphasize short-term strategic goals over sustainable 
development in its development. While AFRICOM strives to integrate these ele-
ments, the US appears to be struggling to find the proper balance between civil-
ian and military components. As one study pointed out, “ironically, perhaps the 
biggest champion of more robust civilian capacities for engaging fragile states is 
the Pentagon itself, which increasingly recognizes the limits of what soldiers can 
do to build enduring institutions in unstable environments.”175
SUMMARy: US STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND ClIMATE ChANGE
The United States currently pursues a strategy of primacy, which entails a world-
wide military presence designed to ensure strategic access to all regions of the 
globe and to hinder the rise of any regional power that might threaten that ac-
cess. In addition, the US has been engaged in broad counterterrorism operations 
against Islamic fundamentalist groups, and military planners view these types 
of asymmetrical threats to be the primary focus of US security policy in the 
near future. To that end, US military basing has undergone a reorganization to 
adjust its focus toward a region that planners refer to as the Arc of Instability. 
Located in the Arc are Islamist terrorist groups, weak states in which they can 
operate freely, and energy resources upon which the US increasingly depends. 
Along with a traditional humanitarian interest in the developing world, these US 
national interests will ensure engagement in the Arc. 
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These interests will undoubtedly be affected by outbreaks of violence and 
conflict, where instability and decreasing human security contribute to increased 
radicalism, threaten energy exports, and present a growing humanitarian crisis 
that may draw in the US. It should be noted, however, that conflict is not neces-
sary for US interests in these regions to be threatened. Social unrest, economic 
inequality, rampant criminal activity and lawlessness, poor governance, and hu-
manitarian disasters represent conflict-free risks to human security that may 
threaten US interests as much as open conflict. The academic debate among 
researchers over whether conflicts will result from the effects of climate change, 
and whether these environmental factors should be securitized becomes there-
fore less relevant in this regard. As US interests are linked directly to human 
security, and most researchers agree that human security is most affected by 
climate change, the environment becomes a security concern whether it is con-
sciously securitized or not.
Reviewing US strategic planning and the adaptations made by both mili-
tary and civilian agencies, it becomes clear that the US has adapted its capacities 
so as to further its national security interests through a focus on human security. 
While the case of Somalia illustrates the continuous balancing act between prag-
matic and normative goals, the overall set of US policies has been increasingly 
directed toward non-kinetic preventative operations, stabilization missions, and 
reconstruction efforts. Taking into account the likely consequences of climate 
change, which will threaten US interests by negatively impacting human security 
in the Arc, the recent capability adaptations by the United States appear to be di-
rected at countering exactly the types of eventualities outlined earlier in section 
four. While the effectiveness of these new policy tools has yet to be ascertained, 
the US will certainly have use for these tools as environmental pressures lead to 
greater and more complex risks to security. While the US has not abandoned 
small-scale direct military counterterrorism operations, it has begun to apply a 
broader, more integrated approach that increasingly resembles that of some Eu-
ropean nations. The next section will briefly examine one European ally to com-
pare how that country incorporates human security into its strategic concept.
Norway: security risks and integrated solutions
In the 2004 document Relevant Force, the Norwegian Defense Department out-
lined its overarching strategic concept.176 The military conceptualized security 
as comprising three parts: state, societal and human security. The document 
described state security as a foundational security interest, which had at its core 
the survival of the state and its territorial defense. Societal security – protec-
tion of civil society and its infrastructure against attack or harm – has grown 
in importance as a result of the emergence of new challenges and new types of 
conflicts since the end of the Cold War. A final component, human security, 
deals with the protection of individuals and their fundamental human rights. 
The recent instances of human security-based military interventions to halt seri-
ous violations of human rights have security implications for Norway, according 
to the document.177
NORWAy’S GlObAl SECURITy ASSESSMENT
The document noted that “in general, globalization has reduced the ability of 
state authorities to exercise control over its own societal development.”178 These 
trends have also reduced the relevance of geographic distance when determining 
the country’s security interests:
Norwegian security interests were previously primarily defined within the Euro-
Atlantic region. However, globalization has reduced the relevance of such a nar-
row perspective. The diminishing importance of geographic distance from po-
tential or actual threats also reduces the relevance of a geographic perspective as 
a key criterion in our security thinking. Keywords like international terrorism, 
cyber warfare, the spreading of weapons of mass destruction and long-range 
weapons systems, and international crime, illustrate the need for a global per-
spective.179
Due to the close link between international security and that of Norway, a se-
curity framework for addressing global challenges through the United Nations 
remains key. As the UN does not retain sufficient capacities to conduct all op-
erations necessary to peace and international security, regional organizations 
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union 
(EU), and the African Union (AU) are given a mandate to conduct various mis-
sions. Norway has as a primary goal to contribute actively to NATO missions; 
176 This document was issued under the previous ruling coalition.
177  Norwegian Ministry of Defence: Relevant Force, October 2004, Government.no 
[online 15 Nov 2007]. This overview is extremely selective and covers only those 
topics most relevant to the discussion at hand.
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NORWAy’S GlObAl SECURITy ASSESSMENT
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NATO’s use of military force is understood to be associated mainly with crisis 
management, stabilization, and conflict-prevention operations. As there is no 
immediate conventional threat to NATO’s immediate area, threats such as inter-
national terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are central.180
Norway’s approach to energy security, as a significant oil and gas produc-
ing nation, acknowledges both its own risks as well as those of its neighbors. In 
a recent speech discussing energy security, NATO, and High North energy de-
velopment, State Secretary for the Defense Department Espen Barth Eide stated 
that:
Future energy crises will most likely also have political overtones. Now, how-
ever, we are facing a new situation due to the growing discrepancy between sup-
ply and demand, which will probably become a major structural problem in the 
not too distant future … The fact that future oil and gas supplies are becoming 
more geographically concentrated only adds to the general concern. By 2025 
approximately one third of the world’s oil production will come from what is 
considered as potentially volatile regions.181
Norway’s European neighbors have become increasingly aware of the risks asso-
ciated with economic dependence on energy imports. The willingness of Russia 
to use gas shipments as a tool of political coercion and the intense political 
maneuvering in Central Asia for expanded energy export routes to Europe (that 
avoid Russian territory) has made the issue of energy security all the more press-
ing. 
NORWAy AND ClIMATE ChANGE RISkS
The 2004 strategic concept noted the existence of regions where conflicts over 
water or other limited resources, uncontrolled population growth, disease, de-
forestation and other environmental problems lead to instability. In these re-
gions, states with weak central governments contribute to international terror-
ism, an increased risk of armed conflict, regional destabilization, refugees and 
humanitarian disasters. Climate change will, in some regions, result in extreme 
environmental conditions that threaten societal, human, and even state security 
in some instances. Demographic trends, including population growth, urban-
ization, and increased pressures on agricultural resources will reduce the living 
standards of large populations. These trends, according to the document, will be 
aggravated by the effects of climate change.182
180 Ibid., p. 32–33.
181 Espen Barth Eide, “Energy security: A common concern”, speech 25 October 2007 
[online 11 Nov 2007].
182 Ibid., p. 28.
The Norwegian government clearly sees climate change as a security threat. 
In October 2007, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre noted that “climate change 
is rapidly becoming a social, economic and geopolitical issue. It is a threat to 
health and food supply – and ultimately a threat to security and peace.”183 In a 
2007 speech, Defense Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen deftly summarized 
the arguments presented above that connect unstable regions of the world with 
the dramatic consequences of climate change that can: 
in some parts of the world lead to drought, in others to strong precipitation 
and floods … more extreme weather with powerful storms, increased soil ero-
sion, ice melting and sea-level rises can in varying degree lead to catastrophes or 
threaten the security of various societies in a number of places in the world. This 
will have just as direct consequences for human security as for societal security 
and state security in the countries most affected.184
The Defense Minister concluded that “in this picture, there is not one dominant 
threat, but many possible threats. Therefore we must have a military that is 
prepared so that it can meet the security challenges … so that we are capable 
of sending reaction forces that can be inserted into unstable areas. We can send 
special forces and intelligence operatives that can discover and disarm illegal 
weapons stores.”
From this short summary, it appears that Norway’s evaluation of global 
strategic threats parallels closely that of the United States. However, the Nor-
wegian concept outlines much more explicit connections between human secu-
rity, international terrorism, and the negative effects of climate change. While 
Norway certainly has ample reason to remain cautious regarding the defense of 
its territory and off-shore interests – especially in light of Russia’s increasingly 
re-assertive foreign policy – the country’s interest in addressing threats to global 
security outlined in the strategic concept continue to resonate strongly. While 
one eye remains focused on the immediate European neighborhood, the other 
focuses its attention on threats farther afield in places like Afghanistan and the 
Sudan.
MANAGING RISkS: DIPlOMACy, PEACE-bUIlDING AND INTEGRATED OPERATIONS
Norway’s historic role as a peacemaker and conflict mediator is well known, 
from the country’s engagement in the Middle East to its attempts to broker an 
agreement in Sri Lanka. In addition to these diplomatic efforts to resolve ex-
183 Johas Gahr Støre, “Nansen’s Compass: A global view on human security challenges”, 
speech at UN House, Tokyo, Japan 25 October 2007 [online 12 Nov 2007]
184 Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, “Dialog om klimaendringer og tverrfaglige utfordringer 
[Dialogue on climate change and interdisciplinary challenges”, speech 20 June 2007, 
Regjeringen.no [online 12 Nov 2007]
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isting conflicts, the Norwegian Minister of the Environment and International 
Development Eric Solheim has partnered with US Senator Richard Lugar to 
address a range of issues discussed in this study. The Lugar-Solheim Develop-
ment Initiative on Energy and Transparency, launched in March 2007, aims 
to reduce the threat of conflict over energy resources in the developing world, 
promote renewable energy resources, encourage transparency and fight corrup-
tion. Focusing directly on the link between climate change and conflict, Lugar 
and Solheim said:
Ending conflict in the world, and reducing the threats that cause conflict have 
been our missions in our public service. The demand for energy resources has 
become a cause of conflict in many developing countries. The production and 
use of fossil fuels continue to cause wide-spread environmental damage, and is 
changing climate patterns through the release of greenhouse gases. This poses 
the risk of even more conflict in the world as changing weather patterns will 
cause droughts and floods, disease and population dislocations. In addition, the 
vast riches derived from the development of energy resources are destabilizing 
many developing countries. Corruption and the lack of transparency undermine 
civil society in developing countries and fuels poverty and the threat and tragedy 
of failed states.
In addition to diplomatic initiatives, Norway has emphasized peace-building 
capacities. The policy takes as its point of departure the realization that a symbi-
otic relationship exists between development and peace – “peace is an important 
pre-condition for development and conversely: development is an important 
pre-condition for lasting and stable peace.”185 Peace-building involves simulta-
neously addressing the three dimensions of the concept: security, political devel-
opment, and social and economic development. As former Development Min-
ister Hilde Frafjord Johnson wrote in 2004, “it is necessary to place increased 
emphasis on peace-building, on preventing violent conflict where such conflicts 
threaten, create the conditions for – and support to – peace-creating processes in 
countries where violent conflicts occur, and to build up the society after conflict 
so that violence does not reoccur.”186 Another Norwegian politician, State Sec-
retary Raymond Johansen, alluded to this type of approach in a 2007 speech, 
saying “we need a holistic approach to the peace and security agenda. The root 
185 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Utviklingspolitikkens bidrag til fredsbygging: 
Norges rolle [Development Policy’s contribution to peace-building: Norway’s role], 
August 2004 [online 10 Nov 2007], p. 10.
186 Ibid., p. 3.
causes for conflict – poverty, human rights abuses, and lack of democracy – must 
be tackled.”187
A third means of addressing security risks associated with conflict and in-
stability is through participation in military operations under a NATO or United 
Nations mandate. In one of the country’s largest newspapers, Dagbladet, Nor-
wegian Defense Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen outlined in March 2007 
the rationale for sending its soldiers to participate in operations such as the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.188 The minister’s 
main argument was humanitarian in nature: the government wished to con-
tribute to conflict resolution and peace in order to help those in need. A sec-
ond reason combined the normative with the pragmatic: regional conflicts can 
spread, states can fail, terrorists can operate freely and present a global threat 
through the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and mass migrations 
of refugees can destabilize entire regions. A final reason was purely pragmatic 
in nature. Norway has a strong interest in international organizations and an 
UN-led world based on international cooperation and international law, as well 
as an interest in a strong NATO alliance. Small nations such as Norway are 
dependent on such alliances to come to their aid when threatened, and therefore 
must contribute to alliance operations to ensure both the survival of the alliance 
and of its smaller member states.
These operations have increasingly become multidimensional in nature, 
encompassing stabilization operations and protection of civilians, humanitarian 
efforts, disarmament and demobilizing armed groups, and assisting in develop-
ing political structures. This has led many to press for operations that integrate 
military, political, and humanitarian expertise and leadership. One proponent 
for such integrated operations is State Secretary Eide, who argues that for UN 
operations, “military power is not the only means, but works together with 
political, economic, and humanitarian efforts. At the same time, military power 
is completely necessary to create security, and security is a pre-condition for de-
velopment and lasting peace. It is important that we coordinate these different 
means even better than today.”189
The Norwegian government has made the conceptual linkage between hu-
man security, state security, and the risks associated with climate change. As a 
small state relying on international institutions for its overall security, Norway 
187 Raymond Johansen, “Peace and security challenges in Africa”, address to the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 4 October 2007, Regjeringen.no [online 
10 Nov 2007].
188 Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, “Hvorfor vi sender soldater utenlands” [Why we send 
soldiers abroad], opinion piece, Dagbladet, 19 March 2007 (Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence [online 11 Nov 2007]).
189 Espen Barth Eide, “Integrerte operasjoner er fremtiden” [Integrated operations are the 
future], speech at the conference “Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations 
– Trends and challenges”, Regjeringen.no [online 10 Nov 2007].
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has a national interest in remaining relevant in addressing threats to interna-
tional security in addition to its image as a peace-maker. Norwegians have there-
fore identified and begun implementation of capabilities that will be useful in 
addressing such challenges through their emphasis on diplomatic efforts to build 
preventative capacities, their focus on peace-building capabilities, and the recog-
nition that integrated operations will become increasingly important.
REFlECTING NATO AND EU APPROAChES TO SECURITy
Not surprisingly, Norway’s strategic concept parallels closely that of NATO. 
The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), endorsed by NATO leaders at 
the summit in Riga, Latvia in November 2006, reflects many of the same threat 
perceptions. The document pointed to terrorism and weapons of mass destruc-
tion as the principle threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years, along 
with “instability due to failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts, and 
their causes and effects; the growing availability of sophisticated conventional 
weaponry; the misuse of emerging technologies; and the disruption of the flow 
of vital resources are likely to be the main risks or challenges for the Alliance in 
that period.”190 Observing that “peace, security and development are more in-
terconnected than ever,” NATO leaders agreed that cooperation and coordina-
tion among organizations will be crucial to crisis prevention and management; 
stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction efforts have also become increas-
ingly significant.191 
NATO clearly intends to focus on addressing threats to the alliance lo-
cated far from its member countries. As the CPG states: “the evolving security 
environment and the need to deal with conventional and especially asymmetric 
threats and risks, wherever they arise” will “put a premium” on the ability 
to “conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from 
home territory.”192 Another important task will be bringing “military support to 
stabilization operations and reconstruction efforts across all phases of an opera-
tion.”193 Reflecting on the Alliance’s list of threats and the capabilities deemed 
necessary to address them, it becomes clear that NATO sees its future military 
operations as occurring in much the same geographic area as the United States: 
the Arc of Instability.
The European Union, in its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), had 
a similar strategic outlook that encompassed many of the same threats, includ-
ing terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and 
organized crime. Notably, the document highlighted the links between poverty, 
conflict, and insecurity. Further, it argued that “competition for natural resourc-
190 NATO, Comprehensive Political Guidance, paragraph 2-3.
191 Ibid., paragraph 6.
192 Ibid., paragraph 16.
193 Ibid.
es – notably water – which will be aggravated by global warming over the next 
decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in vari-
ous regions.” The strategy acknowledged the EU’s energy dependence as a “spe-
cial concern,” noting that energy imports are set to rise to 70 percent of Europe’s 
energy consumption by 2030, and originate from the Persian Gulf, Russia, and 
North Africa.194
An EU study group created a proposal to implement the ESS, and the re-
sulting Barcelona Report was issued in September 2004. It proposed a “human 
security doctrine” for Europe, with three main conclusions. First, it devised a set 
of seven “principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity,” including 
the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-
up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate 
use of force. Second, the Barcelona Report proposed a Human Security Response 
Force of 15,000 people, a third of them civilians (police, human rights monitors, 
humanitarian and development specialists, and administrators). Finally, the re-
port recommended the enactment of a “new legal framework to govern both the 
decision to intervene and operations on the ground.”195 The most recent report 
by the Human Security Study Group was released in November 2007 and fur-
ther developed the human security framework for the EU.196 
194 The European Union Institute for Security Studies, A secure Europe in a better world: 
European Security Strategy, adopted in Brussels 12 December 2003 [online 8 Nov 
2007].
195 Mary Kaldor, et.al., A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, The Barcelona Report of 
the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 15 September 2004 (LSE [online 
10 Nov 2007]), introduction.
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Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report, 8 November 
2007 (LSE [online 12 Nov 2007]).
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decision to intervene and operations on the ground.”195 The most recent report 
by the Human Security Study Group was released in November 2007 and fur-
ther developed the human security framework for the EU.196 
194 The European Union Institute for Security Studies, A secure Europe in a better world: 
European Security Strategy, adopted in Brussels 12 December 2003 [online 8 Nov 
2007].
195 Mary Kaldor, et.al., A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, The Barcelona Report of 
the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 15 September 2004 (LSE [online 
10 Nov 2007]), introduction.
196 Mary Kaldor, et.al., A European Way of Security, The Madrid Report of the Human 
Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report, 8 November 
2007 (LSE [online 12 Nov 2007]).
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Conclusions
A convergence of strategic, political, economic, and climatic trends will likely 
result in US engagement in exactly those regions most vulnerable to climate 
change impacts. The United States strategy of global primacy ensures its con-
tinued interest in regional political and military affairs. The international fight 
against terrorist groups espousing a radical Islamist ideology will continue to 
engage the US and its allies in less developed and less stable regions. As the US 
economy and the US military are dependent on fossil fuels, the US also has a fun-
damental interest in securing uninterrupted flows of those and other raw materi-
als. Finally, the US has always retained an ideological component in its foreign 
policy that encourages humanitarian operations provided the costs to the US in 
blood and treasure are acceptable. The projected effects of climate change in 
those regions deemed of strategic interest for the US and its allies will worsen the 
underlying conditions that make these regions threatening in the first place and 
will increase the likelihood of those risks escalating into even more serious situ-
ations such as uncontrolled migrations, failed states, resource scarcity tensions, 
or region-wide conflicts. These are primarily risks to human security in regions 
collectively referred to by US military planners as the Arc of Instability.
Most of the current threats facing the United States as well as Europe are 
untraditional in the sense that conventional military force alone cannot be ap-
plied to eliminate or contain the threats. It has become clear that the US, Norway 
and its European neighbors have begun to adopt measures that go beyond the 
traditional conceptualizations of security. Without explicitly declaring it, the US 
increasingly focuses its attention on improving human security and reducing the 
risks to it. Examples of this can be seen in State Department programs directed 
toward good governance, capability building for stabilization and reconstruc-
tion efforts, an emerging recognition within the military that unconventional 
war-fighting, humanitarian and stabilization operations are becoming more nec-
essary, and the emergence of an integrated civilian–military entity within the 
Defense Department. 
The US does not act consistently in its endeavors and often chooses short-
term successes at the expense of long-term gains. Recent foreign policy challeng-
es in Uzbekistan, Somalia and Pakistan illustrate the difficult (and often impos-
sible) choices to be made concerning strategic access, tactical victories against 
terrorists, the promotion of democracy, and human rights. The Pentagon’s in-
creasing role in development projects also raises concerns over which actors 
are best suited for these activities. The main priority for the US remains that of 
traditional state security, and addressing human security concerns are an im-
portant, though secondary, consideration. What is striking, however, is how the 
borders between these two security concepts have blurred to the point of being 
indistinguishable. By improving human security in the Arc of Instability, the US 
also improves its national security. As the effects of climate change negatively af-
fect the former, the threats to the latter will likely grow. The military, economic 
and diplomatic tools mentioned here will increasingly be needed as the US reacts 
to the impacts of climate change in the Arc.
The European approach to security follows a course more closely associ-
ated with that of human security. Less focused on possible traditional state-
centered threats, European countries have turned their attention to more nor-
mative concerns such as human rights and development assistance. Despite this 
focus, entities such as the EU still view the international security system in much 
the same manner as the United States, identifying terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction, failed states, international crime and energy insecurity as threats. 
While primarily focused on the more normative human security aspects, the EU 
does this in a way that addresses its traditional state-centered security threats 
as well. While the US takes a top-down approach to security by focusing on 
state and then human security, Europe prioritizes human security as a means by 
which state security can be ensured. 
The differing approaches “meet in the middle” with increasingly similar 
capabilities. While the Europeans speak of integrated operations, the US has 
launched an interagency effort under AFRICOM leadership. As Europe increas-
es its peacekeeping and stabilization capabilities, the US Army has restructured 
its forces and doctrine to meet the same type of need. As Europe focuses on 
diplomacy and preventive steps to reduce the vulnerability of developing coun-
tries, the US State Department has taken many of the same steps. While the ends 
– and increasingly the means – may be similar, the initial priority differences 
force the US and Europe to part ways on two fundamental points: authority and 
legitimacy. While both entities may be working toward the same strategic ends, 
they seem to disagree over who should be in control and how such missions are 
legitimized, questions that are fundamental in resolving policy dilemmas regard-
ing prioritization. Future US administrations may find more support for multi-
lateral operations among a war-weary American public demanding increased 
burden-sharing, drawing Washington even closer to the European view. At this 
point, there is little evidence to show whether or not such capabilities will even 
be effective in addressing the challenges at hand.
Many researchers of the environment, conflict and cooperation resist the 
idea of a military role in planning reactive responses to the effects of climate 
change. As mentioned earlier, the human security focus in American and Euro-
pean security strategies implies some type of military role in the set of climate 
change responses in the Arc. As these regions are characterized by inefficient 
institutions, autocratic leaders and weak states, the institutional and coopera-
tive measures advocated by some academics may not always be viable options. 
US and NATO operations under a UN mandate, especially those exhibiting the 
characteristics of integrated operations, represent both a military and an insti-
tutional solution.
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There is also reason to question future levels of engagement by developed 
countries when humanitarian crises or regional conflicts affect Africa or South 
Asia. The recent history of multinational operations in Afghanistan give little 
cause for optimism, as European governments have been reluctant to contribute 
the resources requested by military commanders. Despite its many challenges, 
Afghanistan might be seen as a “best case” scenario due to the strategic (coun-
terterrorism, avoiding a failed state) and humanitarian interests involved. It may 
be more difficult for developed countries to contribute personnel for operations 
in areas where the strategic relevance is less clear. In addition, the developed 
world may be pre-occupied with its own climate change concerns. While not 
the subject of this study, climate change will affect the entire globe, and even the 
developed world will be forced to channel energy and financial resources into 
adaptive measures. Whether these efforts will cause the wealthier nations to lose 
interest in the developing world remains to be seen.
In a broader sense, the military capabilities being implemented can only 
address the symptoms of the problem rather than the root causes. Demonstrat-
ing that the developed world recognizes the severity of the challenges and has 
begun to create methods for tackling them does not in any way begin to solve 
the underlying cause – greenhouse gas emissions from human activities. Choos-
ing long-term benefits over short-term gains, and choosing cooperation despite 
the risks of uneven cost–benefit distributions, are difficult policy decisions made 
more challenging by the fact that when climate change impacts are clearly seen it 
will then be too late for meaningful preventative action. Others have approached 
these problems in a more thorough manner; this study can only amplify the call 
for a solution based on the findings presented here. The shared threat assessment 
and the strategic adaptations underway provide some foundation for diplomatic 
and military cooperation. It remains to be seen whether the United States will 
make the direct linkage, as Norway has done, between climate change and na-
tional security. Without preventative measures by the international community, 
however, such capabilities may well be completely inadequate in dealing with 
the impacts of climate change over the long term.
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